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TERI J. DOBBINS*
Losing Faith:  Extracting the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith from
(Some) Contracts
Human beings are imperfect.  It is not surprising, then, thatparties often enter into contracts that are incomplete or
that imperfectly express their agreement.  Under classic contract
principles, many of these contracts would be unenforceable.  In
other cases, enforcement would lead to unjust and unintended
results.  Dissatisfied with the results in these cases, courts and
scholars have developed doctrines to fill gaps left by the parties
or otherwise make unenforceable promises enforceable.1  But
even when the parties’ intentions and agreements are clearly and
unambiguously stated, enforcement may be undesirable or ineq-
uitable because one party has taken unfair advantage of the
other by acting dishonestly during contract formation, perform-
ance, or enforcement; by including onerous or unduly burden-
some terms; or by abusing discretion granted to that party under
the contract.  In response, courts have relied upon equitable prin-
ciples to develop doctrines that promote fairness in contractual
relationships.  The implied covenant of good faith is one such
doctrine.2
Although the duty of good faith has been around for centu-
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B.A. 1993, J.D. 1997.  The author thanks Professors Sandra Johnson and Nicole
Porter at the Saint Louis University School of Law for their valuable comments on a
draft of this Article.  The author also gratefully acknowledges the valuable research
assistance of Petya Beltcheva and Corey Wyatt.
1 For example, the doctrines of promissory estoppel, implied covenants, and resti-
tution have all received widespread acceptance in the law of contracts. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 90, 205, 370-77 (1981).
2 The implied covenant is also commonly referred to as the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.  Both courts and scholars seem to treat these as synony-
mous terms.  For the sake of simplicity, this Article will do so as well.  The term
“duty of good faith” will be used to refer to the duty imposed by the implied cove-
nant of good faith. See, e.g., Tufankjian v. Rockland Trust Co., 782 N.E.2d 1, 5
[227]
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ries,3 it did not receive widespread acceptance in the United
States until the mid-twentieth century.  It is now recognized in
some form in most jurisdictions.4  However, although there is
presently general agreement in these jurisdictions that every con-
tract includes an implied covenant of good faith in the perform-
ance of the contract, there is little agreement about how the
common law duty of “good faith” should be defined or what the
duty of good faith requires.5  Indeed, there is debate regarding
whether the term can or should be defined at all.
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (stating that the duty of good faith in every contract translates
into an implied term of the contract).
3 E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963) (“The
inclusion of an obligation of good faith performance in the Code revives an ancient,
although largely forgotten, principle.”).  The duty of good faith is recognized in the
performance of contracts, but there is no generally recognized duty of good faith in
contract formation or enforcement.
4 The doctrine’s widespread acceptance is due in large part to the inclusion of the
duty of good faith in the Uniform Commercial Code. See id.; see also Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369, app. (1980) (citing cases from jurisdictions recognizing the good
faith obligation in every contract at common law); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard
Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 585, 585 n.1 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1979), U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994), and cases from various jurisdictions recognizing the
duty of good faith in common law contracts).  The States of Texas and Indiana, how-
ever, do not recognize a duty of good faith in most arms-length commercial transac-
tions. See Allen v. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (Ind. 2002);
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
5 See, e.g., Seth William Goren, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places:
Problems in Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance, 37 U.S.F. L.
REV. 257, 258 (2003) (“Unfortunately, discussions of good faith in general and the
implied covenant of good faith performance in particular are often laced with incon-
sistencies and failures to use sufficiently specific terms. . . . The consequence[s] of
these lapses and lack of attention to detail is considerable confusion as to the nature
of the covenant of good faith, when the covenant is implicated, and how claims aris-
ing from a breach of the covenant are enforced.”); Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d
588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The Wisconsin cases are cryptic as to [good faith’s] mean-
ing though emphatic about its existence . . . .”). Compare Burnette Techno-Metrics,
Inc. v. TSI Inc., 44 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Under Minnesota law, the implied
covenant requires only ‘that one party not make it impossible for the other party to
perform the contract.’”), and De La Concha, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 849 A.2d
382, 388 (Conn. 2004) (describing that the implied covenant of good faith requires
that “‘neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement’”) (quoting Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 733
A.2d 197, 221 (Conn. 1999)), with Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d
1436, 1445 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the implied covenant of good faith in Illinois
requires parties to exercise discretion “in a manner consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the parties”).
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In his seminal 1968 article on good faith, Professor Robert S.
Summers argued that good faith cannot be defined and can only
be understood by reference to “bad faith.”6  Others have argued
that good faith should be defined in terms of the parties’ reason-
able expectations7 or as a duty to refrain from seeking to recap-
ture opportunities forgone at the time of contracting.8  Still
others have concluded that good faith can only be defined in the
context of the particular contract at issue, so that the determina-
tion of whether a party has violated the implied covenant of good
faith must be made on a case-by-case basis.9  Finally, jurisdictions
vary with respect to whether the implied covenant exists in every
contract or only in certain contracts, such as those in which the
parties have a “special relationship.”10
Despite decades of attempts to clarify the good-faith duty and
its application in various contracts, almost all acknowledge that
the cases in which courts have applied the duty of good faith are
rife with inconsistencies and confusion, even within single juris-
dictions.11  Yet, most commentators who have examined and
6 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) [hereinafter Sum-
mers, Good Faith].  “In contract law, taken as a whole, good faith is an ‘excluder.’  It
is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a
wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.” Id. at 201 (citation omitted).  This
approach was adopted by the Second Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981).
7 E.g., Diamond & Foss, supra note 4, at 594.
8 E.g., Burton, supra note 4, at 378 (proposing a conceptualization of good faith in
which “a party fails to perform in good faith when it uses . . . discretion to recapture
forgone opportunities.”).
9 See, e.g., Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co.,
108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that whether conduct meets
standard of good faith must be determined on a case-by-case basis); Amoco Oil Co.
v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 499 (Colo. 1995) (“Whether a party acted in good faith is a
question of fact which must be determined on a case by case basis.”).
10 For example, Texas does not recognize a general duty of good faith in ordinary
arms-length transactions, but does recognize a duty in contracts between parties
with a “special relationship,” such as insurer-insured, joint venturers, or partners in a
partnership.  Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc.,
960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998); see also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
11 See, e.g., Diamond & Foss, supra note 4, at 585-86 (stating that “the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is shrouded in mystery” and declaring that
“[e]fforts to devise workable standards or relevant criteria for determining when the
covenant has been violated have been unavailing.”); Honorable Howard L. Fink,
The Splintering of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Illinois
Courts, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 247 (1999) (calling Illinois courts “splintered about
not only the correct remedy, but also about whether there should be a remedy at all
when a contracting party fails to carry out its promises in good faith”); Goren, supra
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even critiqued the good faith doctrine have defended its useful-
ness or even its necessity, arguing that the implied covenant of
good faith is an essential tool that enables courts to protect the
expectations of the parties and to promote fairness in the per-
formance of contracts.12  Thus, most articles and commentary
discussing good faith have focused on finding ways to create a
workable definition or conceptualization13 of good faith and on
debating its proper scope and application.14
This Article argues that in many contracts, the implied cove-
nant of good faith is not capable or worthy of being saved from
the chaos that currently surrounds it.  The inability to define
good faith leaves contracting parties with no clear understanding
of their obligations.  For this reason alone, courts should be wary
of including the implied covenant of good faith in every contract.
But what makes the good-faith duty unworthy of salvation is the
fact that other contract doctrines exist that more effectively serve
note 5, at 258 (noting the confusion in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions “as to
the nature of the covenant of good faith, when the covenant is implicated, and how
claims arising from a breach of the covenant are enforced”); Emily M.S. Houh, Criti-
cal Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good
Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1033 (2003) (noting that the stan-
dard by which good faith is discerned “can be frustratingly elusive”); Michael K.
Martin & Daniel L. Cummings, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith: Now You See
It, Now You Don’t, 9 ME. B. J. 306 (1994) (discussing inconsistent opinions from
Maine courts regarding the duty of good faith).
12 See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 812 (1982) [hereinafter Summers,
Recognition and Conceptualization] (“It is a kind of ‘safety valve’ to which judges
may turn to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under
rules of law and specific contract language.”).
13 The term “conceptualization” is used to mean “an intellectual construct that
represents or embodies an idea formulated in words for some general or special
purpose or purposes.” Id. at 816.
14 See, e.g., Diamond & Foss, supra note 4, at 586 (“This article seeks to provide a
structured framework that would substantially diminish ad hoc decision making.  It
also seeks to resolve confusion about when the covenant can be waived and what
remedies the covenant provides.”); Jason Randal Erb, The Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Alaska: One Court’s License to Override Contractual
Expectations, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 35 (1994) (making recommendations to counter-
act the uncertainty for contracting parties created by decisions based increasingly on
public policy instead of the reasonable expectations of the parties); Houh, supra
note 11, at 1025 (arguing that “courts should use the doctrine of good faith in con-
tract law to prohibit improper considerations of race in contract formation and per-
formance”); Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good
Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1230, 1278-80 (1999) (arguing against textual-
ist approach to the duty of good faith, but stating that good faith “reflects important
institutional values in the law of contracts”).
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the purposes for which the duty of good faith is often employed,
while more carefully adhering to the parties’ actual bargain.
This Article does not argue that the duty of good faith should
be removed from all contracts.  The implied covenant of good
faith may be appropriate in certain categories of contracts where
the duty can be defined with a reasonable degree of clarity, thus
putting parties on notice of their obligations at the time of con-
tracting.  For instance, the covenant may be implied to address
situations unforeseen at the time of contracting or to interpret
ambiguous or incomplete contracts.  Moreover, the duty of good
faith in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should be
preserved.15
Instead, this Article argues that courts should abandon the rule
that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith.  If
the contract is sufficiently fair that it is not unconscionable or in
violation of public policy and it is sufficiently clear that no im-
plied obligation is required to make the contract enforceable or
unambiguous, then no implied covenant of good faith is neces-
sary or desirable.16  The good-faith duty should no longer be used
to impose obligations inconsistent with the parties’ bargain, to
deny rights that are expressly conferred in a contract, or to make
unambiguous and otherwise enforceable contracts more “just” or
“fair” in the eyes of the factfinder.
The desire to limit the application of the duty of good faith in
unambiguous, otherwise enforceable contracts is not driven by a
desire to elevate text over substance, or by a yearning to return
to formalist rules of contract interpretation.  Instead, it is based
on a conviction that the parties’ agreement should take prece-
dence over the parties’ expectations, to the extent that the two
do not coincide.  Moreover, it recognizes that expectations or the
anticipated “fruits” of the contract are often difficult or impossi-
ble to discern and courts’ attempts to impose liability based on
these elusive notions result in inconsistent and imprudent out-
comes.  Consequently, parties are left with no clear understand-
ing of their obligations, even when the contract terms are
15 This Article does not address extensively the duty of good faith in other statutes
or the duty of good faith as an express contractual term.  It focuses only on the
implied covenant of good faith and, to a lesser extent, the duty of good faith in the
Uniform Commercial Code.
16 However, duties such as the duty of cooperation or the duty of disclosure that
are often associated with or subsumed within the duty of good faith may continue to
be recognized. See discussion infra Part V.
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unambiguous.17
Equally important, parties may not share the same expecta-
tions and one party may be ignorant of the expectations of the
other.  Requiring a party to act in accordance with the other
party’s unknown expectations is itself inequitable.  Instead,
courts should begin with the presumption that the parties are jus-
tified in expecting performance and results (or “fruits”) consis-
tent with the express terms of their agreement.  Likewise, absent
evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or facts giving rise to a
claim of estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, or other grounds for
denying enforcement, parties should be able to exercise rights
consistent with the express terms of their agreement without fear
of liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith.  This
should be so even if the exercise of those rights leads to results
inconsistent with the other party’s expectations.
Finally, although courts deny that parties are required to be-
have altruistically,18 many have relied on the vague concept of
good faith to impose liability when a party has done nothing
more than fail to go beyond the obligations imposed in the con-
tract for the benefit of the other party.19  While courts should be
able to use equitable defenses and remedies to protect parties
from various forms of overreaching and from onerous or unduly
burdensome terms that violate public policy, using the implied
covenant of good faith to enforce general notions of fairness can
be more harmful than helpful.
Part I of this Article examines the role of equity in contract
law and the use of the implied covenant of good faith as a tool of
equity.  Part II discusses the contracts and contexts in which the
implied covenant of good faith is a necessary and appropriate
term of the contract.  The reasons for its usefulness in those con-
tracts and contexts are discussed, including its role as an interpre-
17 Indeed, it is remarkable that courts do not hesitate to impose liability for
breach of the duty of good faith when the courts themselves cannot agree on the
scope of the obligation.  This, however, is not unheard-of in the law of contracts (or
other areas of the law).  Many concepts, such as reasonableness, are similarly impre-
cise yet prevalent.  The prevalence of these concepts, however, does not make them
desirable.  To the extent that more precise concepts are available, they should be
used; if vague concepts can be avoided, they should be avoided.
18 See Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 (N.J. 2001) (stating
that parties are not required to behave altruistically toward the other party); see also
Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
19 See, e.g., Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1997) (dis-
cussed infra Part III.C).
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tive aid and gap-filler, and in contracts granting sole discretion to
one party.
Part III argues that jurisdictions should abandon the rule that
the covenant should be included in every contract.  Dominant
conceptualizations of good faith and cases employing those con-
ceptualizations are analyzed to illustrate the detrimental effects
of implying the covenant in every contract, including the inclina-
tion of courts to use the implied covenant of good faith to add to
or modify the terms of the parties’ agreement.  It is further ar-
gued that the good-faith covenant should not be used to punish
parties for exercising rights expressly granted under the unam-
biguous terms of the contract or to impose obligations inconsis-
tent with the parties’ bargain.
Part IV discusses the availability of other remedies to achieve
the equitable results desired by courts.  Part V refutes the argu-
ment that without the implied covenant of good faith courts will
necessarily return to formalist presumptions and refuse to look
beyond the plain meaning of the contract to determine the par-
ties’ intent.  Instead, the Article advocates a more expansive view
of contract interpretation that looks beyond the four corners of
the agreement to determine if ambiguities exist and to resolve
those ambiguities.  The resulting agreement, instead of the par-
ties’ expectations, should be the basis for determining whether a
party is in breach.
Finally, Part VI addresses concerns that, without the duty of
good faith, some discrete duties that are often viewed as a part of
the duty of good faith will no longer apply.  Instead of implying
the expansive but amorphous duty of good faith, it is suggested
that courts may, when necessary, imply the narrower, well-de-
fined duties that are relevant to the specific context and type of
contract at issue.
I
GOOD FAITH AS A TOOL OF EQUITY
Equity certainly has a rightful place in the law of contracts, but
the degree to which equity can or should supplement or super-
sede agreements is at the heart of the debate regarding when and
how the implied covenant of good faith should be applied.  Equi-
table doctrines have traditionally provided relief when there is
no adequate remedy at law.  Equitable defenses and remedies
are intended to “do justice,” although the manner in which they
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have generally been applied is not as vague as that term might
suggest.  The doctrines cannot be invoked simply because a con-
tract favors one party’s interests or because the contract is objec-
tively unfair.20
Equitable doctrines have been developed to protect expecta-
tions that are the result of the actions or statements of another.
Doctrines such as fraud and misrepresentation ensure that one
party is not coerced or tricked into believing that certain rights or
obligations exist when they do not.  Defenses such as duress, un-
due influence, and incapacity excuse one party from a bargain
entered into against its will or at a time when it was unable to
comprehend the nature of the transaction.21  The remedy of ref-
ormation allows the court to rewrite a contract to reflect the par-
ties’ actual intentions.22  Promissory and equitable estoppel
provide remedies when one party’s otherwise unenforceable
promise or action induces foreseeable reliance by another.23
Each of these doctrines remedies defects in the process of con-
tract formation, but none provides relief based on dissatisfaction
with the substance of the parties’ agreement if the agreement was
freely and knowingly entered into by competent parties.
Even the doctrine of unconscionability requires more than a
contract that is more favorable to one party than the other.  In-
20 Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Beckner, 597 S.E.2d 34, 38 (Va. 2004) (“A court of
equity will not set aside a contract because it is ‘rash, improvident or [a] hard bar-
gain’ but equity will act if the circumstances raise the inference that the contract was
the result of imposition, deception, or undue influence.”) (quoting Payne v. Sim-
mons, 350 S.E.2d 637, 640 (Va. 1986)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 79 (1981) (stating that courts will not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration).  However, courts may refuse to grant equitable remedies if the con-
tract is unfair. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 (1981) (“Specific
performance or an injunction will be refused if such relief would be unfair because
. . . the exchange is grossly inadequate or the terms of the contract are otherwise
unfair.”).
21 See, e.g., Friendly Ice Cream, 597 S.E.2d at 31 (“To set aside a deed or contract
on the basis of undue influence requires a showing that the free agency of the con-
tracting party has been destroyed.  Because undue influence is a species of fraud, the
person seeking to set aside the contract must prove undue influence by clear and
convincing evidence.”) (citations omitted); Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, 27 P.3d 433,
436 (Mont. 2001) (stating that a person lacks capacity to enter into a contract if the
party is incapable of understanding the force and effect of the alleged agreement).
22 “Where a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement in whole or in part
fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both parties as to the contents
of or effect of the writing, the court may at the request of a party reform the writing
to express the agreement . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155
(1981).
23 See id. § 90.
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stead, the disputed term or contract must be one “that no prom-
isor with any sense, and not under a delusion, would make, and
that no honest and fair promisee would accept.”24  Although this
definition is almost as vague as the definition of “good faith,”
courts generally have been cautious about finding contracts or
provisions unconscionable and have consistently required some-
thing more than a simple imbalance in the benefits received
under the contract.25  Indeed, even in Texas, where courts cannot
use the duty of good faith to regulate performance, courts are not
eager to void contracts on grounds of unconscionability.26
Perhaps because they are dissatisfied with these doctrines,
many courts have begun to use the implied covenant of good
faith to protect party expectations.  Unfortunately, it has been
applied to protect those expectations when the other party has
acted within the express terms of the agreement, even when the
terms of the contract are neither ambiguous nor unconsciona-
ble.27  It has also been applied to protect expectations that are
unilaterally held and perhaps even unknown by the party who
violated those expectations.28
The implied covenant of good faith has been described as a
means to do “justice, and justice according to law.”29  It is a tool
24 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (8th ed. 2004).  A term is only unconscionable if
it is “‘such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.’” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (quoting Hume v. United States, 132
U.S. 406, 411 (1889)).
25 “On the whole, judges have been cautious in applying the doctrine of uncon-
scionability, recognizing that the parties often must make their contract quickly, that
their bargaining power will rarely be equal, and that courts are ill-equipped to deal
with problems of unequal wealth in society.  Most cases of unconscionability involve
a combination of procedural and substantive unconscionability, and it is generally
agreed that if more of one is present, then less of the other is required.” E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 at 559 (2d. ed. 1998); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981) (“Inadequacy of con-
sideration does not of itself invalidate a bargain, but gross disparity in the values
exchanged may be an important factor in a determination that the contract is uncon-
scionable . . . .”).
26 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 115 S.W.3d 126, 135 (Tex. App. 2003) (noting
that a contract will not be void on grounds of unconscionability if its terms are
merely lawful but improvident).
27 See, e.g., Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 253 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2001)
(discussed infra Part III.A).
28 See id.
29 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 198.  Professor Summers also described
good faith as “a kind of ‘safety valve’ to which judges may turn to fill gaps and
qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules of law and specific
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enabling courts to enforce notions of fairness and justice between
the parties.30  In this sense, it is an equitable tool.31  Yet, the duty
of good faith is distinctive in that the implied covenant becomes a
substantive term of the contract, not a defense or remedial mea-
sure.  In some jurisdictions where the covenant is included in
every contract, the duty is imposed even if there is no finding
that there was unequal bargaining power, grossly unfair terms,32
or that the agreement fails to accurately reflect the parties’ bar-
gain or intent.  Even unambiguous, complete, fully integrated
contracts include an obligation of good faith and fair dealing.33
In such cases, it only serves to impose a general obligation of
fairness and reasonableness that is at odds with traditional con-
tract law.34
Although the covenant of good faith does not on its face re-
quire fair terms, interpretation in a manner that requires per-
formance that is “fair” and “reasonable” leads to the same result.
Parties cannot merely perform in accordance with the terms of a
valid, enforceable contract; the performance must lead to a result
that the court believes to be fair.  In other words, the terms of the
contract language.”  Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 12, at
812.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (describing that
good faith “excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad
faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness”).
31 See Summers, Recognition and Conceptualization, supra note 12, at 811 (opin-
ing that good faith “is of a piece with explicit requirements of ‘contractual morality’
such as the unconscionability doctrine and various general equitable principles”) (ci-
tation omitted); Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD.
L. REV. 253, 273 (1991) (“The values that drive equitable defenses are values of
fairness and justice between parties.”).
32 See, e.g., Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002) (stating that disparate bargaining strength “is not the sine qua non” of an
action for breach of the duty of good faith).
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).  Thus, the covenant
is implied even if no aspect of the performance is discretionary, no terms have been
left open, and no circumstances have arisen that were not contemplated at the time
of contract formation.
34 See id. § 79 (“If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional
requirement of . . . equivalence in the values exchanged . . . or ‘mutuality of
obligation.’”).
Ordinarily . . . courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. . . .
Gross inadequacy of consideration may be relevant to issues of capacity,
fraud and the like, but the requirement of consideration is not a safeguard
against imprudent and improvident contracts except in cases where it ap-
pears that there is no bargain in fact.
Id. §  79 cmt. c.
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contract are not controlling if they lead to an unfair result.  Con-
sistent with this view of good faith, the implied covenant has
been used to protect parties who willingly and knowingly enter
into facially fair contracts but are disappointed by results that fail
to live up to the party’s expectations or yield the expected
“fruits.”35  In this way, the implied covenant of good faith makes
every party a guarantor of the other party’s satisfaction with the
outcome of the bargain.  It does not look to whether the agree-
ment was deemed fair by all parties at the time it was entered
into, but instead looks to whether, in retrospect and in light of
the other party’s performance in accordance with the terms of the
contract, the party is satisfied with the agreement.
Use of the covenant of good faith in this manner is ill advised.
Just as there is no requirement that the terms of the contract be
fair or just, there should be no separate requirement that the par-
ties’ performance be fair or just, so long as the performance is
consistent with the parties’ agreement and the agreement itself is
not unenforceable on other grounds, such as unconscionability.
In short, courts should not be allowed to rely on the implied cov-
enant of good faith as a way to reform or overrule contracts that
are too reasonable to be unconscionable but too one-sided to be
objectively fair.
II
CONTRACTS IN WHICH THE COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH IS WORTH KEEPING
In certain contexts, such as those discussed below, the implied
covenant of good faith can be employed in a manner that fur-
thers both the intent of the parties and important public policy
goals.  For example, in cases involving parties in “special rela-
tionships,” the implied covenant of good faith can be well-de-
fined and tailored to the nature of the relationship involved,
thereby avoiding many of the pitfalls associated with the amor-
phous concept of good faith as applied to all contracts.  In addi-
tion, the duty of good faith in the UCC is discussed and approved
of as a part of a comprehensive statutory scheme that includes
definitions of the term.36  Finally, the implied covenant can be
useful as a gap-filler to rescue otherwise unenforceable contracts,
35 See discussion infra Part III.
36 See discussion infra Part II.B.
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or as an interpretive aid to discern the parties’ actual intent or
bargain in ambiguous contracts or provisions.  In particular, it is
an appropriate tool to limit a party’s exercise of contractually
granted exclusive discretion, so long as it is applied in a way that
is consistent with the express terms of the agreement.
A. Special Relationships
Although a disparity in bargaining power does not always re-
sult in a contract that is unfair or that violates public policy, cer-
tain categories of contracts warrant inclusion of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing on public policy grounds.
These categories include insurance contracts, which impact large
numbers of citizens (consequently impacting the economy of the
community) in fundamentally important ways.37  They also in-
clude joint venture and partnership contracts, because the parties
are engaged in an enterprise in which they have a common inter-
est.38  The duty of good faith in these contracts addresses some of
the most egregious situations and most vulnerable parties, as well
as cases in which the parties have expressly agreed to work coop-
eratively or in which one party has expressly placed their trust in
the judgment of the other.  It does not, however, usurp party au-
tonomy in all cases, nor does it impose obligations of fidelity
when the parties themselves have not intended to create or take
on those obligations.
The most obvious advantage to restricting the good-faith cove-
nant to “special relationship” contracts is that instead of relying
on vague notions of fairness or reasonableness, the duty of good
faith can be more precisely defined in terms relevant to the type
of contract involved.  In the insurance context, the duty of good
faith may require the insurer to “give at least as much considera-
tion to the welfare of its insured as it gives to its own interests.
The governing standard is whether a prudent insurer would have
accepted the settlement offer if it alone were liable for the entire
37 See Cent. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Stemmons N.W. Bank, N.A., 848 S.W.2d 232,
239 (Tex. App. 1992) (“the [Texas Supreme Court] has found such a ‘special rela-
tionship’ arises only in the context of an insured and its insurer under an insurance
policy because of the parties’ unequal bargaining power and the nature of insurance
contracts that would allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds’
misfortunes in bargaining for settlement or resolution of claims.”); Freeman & Mills,
Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 672 (Cal. 1995) (emphasizing “the ‘special
relationship’ between insurer and insured, characterized by elements of public inter-
est, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility”).
38 Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 442 (Tex. App. 1998).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 13 21-OCT-05 9:24
Losing Faith 239
judgment.”39  This standard reflects the insured’s dependence
upon the insurer to defend the insured against third-party
claims.40
Parties to a joint venture or members of a partnership have a
“special relationship” that is fiduciary in nature.41  In those con-
texts, the duty of good faith means more than simple reasonable-
ness or fairness.  Instead, parties “bear the obligation of the
utmost good faith and integrity in their dealings with one
another.”42
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduci-
ary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As
to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate.43
39 Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (Cal. 1979); see also
Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (“A
cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is stated when it
is alleged that there is no reasonable basis for denial of a claim or delay in payment
or a failure on the part of the insurer to determine whether there is any reasonable
basis for the denial or delay.”).
40 Jonathan Neil & Assocs., Inc. v. Jones, 94 P.3d 1055, 1068 (Cal. 2004).  Without
the obligation of good faith, the insurer would be able to arbitrarily reject settlement
offers and take its chances at trial, secure in the knowledge that even if the insured is
hit with a large judgment, the insurer’s liability will not exceed its coverage amount.
41 See, e.g., TSA Int’l. Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp., 990 P.2d 713 (Haw. 1999) (noting the
fiduciary relationship between partners); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d
543 (Tex. 1998) (same); see also Pear v. Grand Forks Motel Assocs., 553 N.W.2d 774
(N.D. 1996) (stating that relationship between partners is fiduciary and confiden-
tial).  Because these relationships are fiduciary in nature, the standard of care re-
quired is higher than for arms-length commercial transactions. Bank One, 967
S.W.2d at 442 (“While both fiduciary and extracontractual special relationships es-
tablish a duty of good faith and fair dealing from which tort damages result, the two
duties have a different standard of care.  A fiduciary duty requires the fiduciary to
place the interest of the other party before his own, if necessary, whereas the com-
mon law duty of good faith and fair dealing merely requires the parties to deal fairly
with one another.”) (citation omitted).
42 In re Estate of Thomas, 532 N.W.2d 676, 683 (N.D. 1995); see, e.g., Starr v.
Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Mass. 1995) (“Partners owe each other a fiduciary
duty of the highest degree of good faith and fair dealing.”).
43 Heller v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 636 A.2d 599, 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1993) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. App. 1928)).
When a fiduciary relationship exists, a partner’s silence as to a material matter can
constitute fraud.  Ong Int’l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah
1993); Redwend Ltd. P’ship v. Edwards, 581 S.E.2d 496, 505 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(“In all matters connected with the partnership every partner is bound to act in a
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Not surprisingly, courts disagree about which contracts should
include a good-faith covenant, and whether breach of the cove-
nant in these “special relationship” contracts should give rise to a
claim based solely in contract or in tort.  For instance, in Texas,
only contracts between parties with a special relationship include
a covenant of good faith, but the breach of the covenant is an
independent tort.44  In California, there is an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in every contract, but the breach of
the covenant only gives rise to a breach of contract claim unless
the contract is between parties in a “special relationship.”45  A
breach of the good-faith covenant in a special relationship con-
tract is an independent tort.46
Courts or legislatures can identify additional categories of con-
tracts or relationships in which there is a significant disparity of
bargaining power, or which have a sufficient impact on the com-
munity as a whole, that the duty of good faith is necessary to
protect the weaker party or protect the public interest.47  The
duty of good faith may vary according to the context, but when
the precise type of contract is identified, the scope of the duty is
more easily defined.  This is so because it is easier for the courts
or legislatures to define the duty of good faith between parties in
a particular context than to try to define it in a manner that en-
compasses every contract.
Although limiting the good-faith duty to parties in a special
relationship excludes many categories of contracting parties who
may be susceptible to unfair or onerous (but not unconscionable)
manner not to obtain any advantage over his copartner in the partnership affairs by
the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any
kind. A partner cannot act too quickly to protect his own financial position at the
expense of his partners, even in the absence of malice.”) (quoting 59A Am. Jur. 2d
Partnership § 420 (1987) (citations omitted)).
44 See Bank One, 967 S.W.2d at 441.
45 Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 672 (Cal. 1995).
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act (ADDCA), 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e)
(2000) (defining duty of good faith as “the duty of each party to any franchise . . . to
act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one
party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation
from the other party . . . .”).  The duty of good faith in this statute has been inter-
preted to require actual or threatened coercion or intimidation as an element of an
ADDCA claim.  Likewise, courts or legislatures could decide to include a duty of
good faith in employment contracts, although this idea has already been rejected by
some courts and has been the subject of much scholarly debate. See, e.g., Houh,
supra note 11, at 1029 (arguing that good faith in employment context should pre-
clude termination on a discriminatory basis).
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contracts—particularly consumers—state and federal consumer
protection statutes often protect those parties in a much more
comprehensive and predictable manner than an implied cove-
nant of good faith.48  Many of the statutes include a duty of good
faith, but, as discussed above, that duty can be defined in the
statute or in reference to the particular context.49  Moreover,
terms in a contract of adhesion will not be enforced if the term is
beyond the reasonable expectation of the adhering party.50  This
serves essentially the same purpose as the implied covenant of
good faith, but limits its application to cases in which there is a
disparity in bargaining power.51
B. Uniform Commercial Code
There are several reasons for maintaining the good-faith duty
in the UCC.  Keeping good faith is pragmatic because the UCC is
a statute requiring legislative approval for revision or amend-
ment.  Considering the recent amendment of Article 1, including
the expanded definition of good faith, and the many references
to good faith throughout the Code, it is unlikely that legislatures
will agree to extract the duty of good faith from the UCC any
time soon.  Additionally, there is less need to do so than in the
common law, because fewer courts have applied the duty of good
faith in cases governed by the UCC in as expansive a manner as
they have when applying the common law duty of good faith.  In
fact, relatively few cases have imposed liability solely for breach
of the duty of good faith.52
48 See, e.g., ADDCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25; Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2000); Delaware Auto-
mobile Lemon Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 5002 (1999); Illinois Franchise Disclo-
sure Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/9 (2004); Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (2001); Wisconsin Lemon Law, WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 218.0171 (2000).
49 See, e.g., ADDCA § 1221(e).
50 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); Graham v.
Scissor-Tail, Inc. 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs., Ltd.,
840 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992).
51 It is true that this focuses on the contract terms instead of the party’s perform-
ance, but the two are inextricably intertwined.  If the contract terms allow for per-
formance that is inconsistent with the party’s expectation, the term is beyond the
party’s reasonable expectation.
52 See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex.
1999) (deciding that the UCC’s statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
performance, enforcement, and modification of a commercial contract does not ap-
ply to a final release of liability executed by the parties).
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Courts’ restraint in enforcing the duty of good faith may be
attributed to the fact that good faith is defined in the Code.53
While imprecise, the definition at least attempts to articulate a
standard.54  Indeed, it is that fact that has led to criticism of the
UCC standard by those who argue that the duty is too narrow.55
Yet the definition in revised Article 1,56 which includes the objec-
tive standard requiring observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing, at least provides notice of the standard
by which performance will be judged.  Whether that standard
provides much guidance is debatable, but it provides more gui-
dance than is available for non-UCC transactions.  The UCC also
more clearly and comprehensively defines the parties’ rights and
obligations with respect to other aspects of transactions, leaving
less to the discretion of the parties and the courts.57  Obligations
of good faith included in other statutory schemes may be worth
preserving for similar reasons.  Set in a particular context as a
defined term, the duty takes on a more concrete and predictable
meaning that is absent in the common law.
C. Gap-filler or Interpretive Aid
In many cases, whether intentionally or inadvertently, parties
53 U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2004) (“‘Good faith,’ except as otherwise provided in Arti-
cle 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing.”).
54 The definition, of course, varies based upon the Article in question and the
version enacted by a particular state. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (pre-2001 revision)
(“‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”); 2-
103(1)(b) (pre-2001 amendment to conform to Article 1 revision) (“‘Good faith’ in
the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”).
55 See, e.g., Summers, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 215 (“[T]he Code’s definitions
restrictively distort the doctrine of good faith.”).  The narrow definition in the pre-
2001 version might also explain the relatively small number of cases imposing liabil-
ity based solely upon a breach of the duty of good faith.
56 Uniform Commercial Code Article 1 was revised in 2001.  The revised version
has been adopted in eight states (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Minnesota, Texas, and Virginia) as of the time of this writing.  Bills proposing the
adoption of Revised Article 1 are pending in Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia.
57 E.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (2004) (stating specifically that written agreements may be
supplemented by course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade);
§§ 2-308, 2-309 (providing default terms if the parties neglect to include those terms
in their agreement); §§ 2-314, 2-315 (giving notice of implied warranties); § 2-706
(spelling out sellers’ rights and obligations regarding resale after wrongful rejection
or revocation).
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will enter into contracts that are enforceable yet incomplete.  Al-
though parties may decide to leave certain terms open (such as
price, quantity, or time for performance), contracts often fail to
address issues because parties could not have contemplated the
circumstances requiring a particular term or because the right or
obligation was so obvious to the parties that inclusion of the term
was deemed unnecessary.58  While the use of implied covenants
generally is not favored, courts use them to fill in the gaps in such
circumstances.59  Implied covenants are also useful as aids to in-
terpret ambiguous contracts or terms.60
When applied appropriately, use of the duty of good faith to
fill in gaps or to interpret contracts appropriately recognizes the
primacy of the bargain while acknowledging that parties are
often unable to anticipate and account for every occurrence in
their agreements.  It further recognizes that the parties’ intent
may be imperfectly expressed in the written agreement.61  How-
58 See Continental Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66, 80 (N.M.
1993) (“When it is clear . . . from the relevant parts of the contract taken together
and considered with the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the
agreement, that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the par-
ties or was necessary to effect their intention, then such obligation may be implied
and enforced.”).
59 See, e.g., Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (“The courts will imply a covenant if necessary to effectuate the intent of
the parties.  But ‘the implication must result from the language employed in the
instrument or be indispensable to carrying the intention of the parties into effect.’”)
(quoting Closuit v. Mitby, 56 N.W.2d 428, 432-33 (Minn. 1953)); Bank One, Texas,
N.A. v. Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 434 (Tex. App. 1998) (“[T]he court looks beyond
the written agreement to imply a covenant only if necessary to effectuate the inten-
tion of the parties as disclosed by the contract as a whole . . . .”).  For example, in a
lease that requires the lessee to send rental payments to the lessor annually, but
which is silent regarding notification of a change of land ownership, the court may
imply a covenant requiring the lessor to notify the lessee of any change of ownership
or to accept late payments when the delay is due to the lessee’s ignorance of the
change in ownership and the lessee has made a reasonable effort to comply with the
lease terms. See Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Cox, 729 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1999).
60 See, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. VIII S. Michigan Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1104 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (“The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is essentially used to
determine the intent of the parties where a contract is susceptible to two conflicting
constructions.”); Gerdlund v. Elec. Dispensers Int’l, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract
has been held in certain special cases to supply a requirement of good cause for
termination where the contract itself is silent or ambiguous on that subject.”).
61 See In re Vylene Enters., Inc., 90 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1999).  In Vylene, a
franchise agreement included an option to extend the agreement beyond the initial
ten-year term “on terms and conditions to be negotiated.” Id. at 1473.  The court
held that while the term was too vague to be enforceable as a right to renew, the
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ever, it is not a license to overrule or modify express contract
terms,62 nor should the covenant be implied simply to make the
contract more reasonable or fair.63  Instead, the implied covenant
of good faith should, to the extent possible, give effect to the
parties’ actual intent and agreement, not the agreement that
should have been made or that would lead to a just result.
A common example of the implied covenant of good faith as a
gap-filler or interpretive aid is its use in contracts granting discre-
tion to one party with respect to some aspect of the contract.
Such discretion might be given in setting price or date of per-
formance, or in assessing the quality or acceptability of perform-
ance under the contract (“satisfaction clauses”).  Many courts,
even those that are reluctant to recognize implied covenants,
have embraced the duty of good faith in this context.64  This uni-
form acceptance of the implied covenant of good faith in this
context reflects its value.
Yet despite the multitude of cases applying good faith in dis-
cretionary contracts, courts have been somewhat inconsistent in
applying the duty of good faith when assessing a party’s exercise
of discretion.  This inconsistency may stem in part from a digres-
sion from the original reason for including the implied covenant
of good faith to discretionary contracts.  Under classic contract
principles, total discretion on the part of one party made the con-
franchisor had an implied obligation to negotiate in good faith regarding the exten-
sion. Id. at 1476.
62 N. Trust, 657 N.E.2d at 1104 (“[A]n implied covenant of good faith cannot over-
rule or modify the express terms of a contract.”); see also, e.g., Kassebaum v. Kas-
sebaum, 42 S.W.3d 685, 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]here can be no implication
where the subject is completely covered by the contract.”).
63 See, e.g., Kassebaum, 42 S.W.3d at 696 (“It is not enough to say that the implied
term is necessary to make the contract fair, or that without such implied term the
contract would be improvident or unwise, or that the contract would operate un-
justly.”); Bank One, 967 S.W.2d at 434 (describing covenant implied to effectuate
the intention of the parties, “but not to make the contract fair, wise, or just”).
64 See, e.g., Dayan v. McDonald’s Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(“[T]he courts of this state have held that a party vested with contractual discretion
must exercise that discretion reasonably and with proper motive, and may not do so
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties.”); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App. 1992)
(holding that Texas law implies duty of good faith in contract giving one party “sole
discretion” to determine the quality of the other party’s performance); Wilson v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 (N.J. 2001) (“[A] party exercising its right
to use discretion in setting price under a contract breaches the duty of good faith and
fair dealing if that party exercises its discretionary authority arbitrarily, unreasona-
bly, or capriciously, with the objective of preventing the other party from receiving
its reasonably expected fruits under the contract.”).
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tract unenforceable because the discretion-exercising party’s
promise was illusory.65  To rescue such contracts, courts either
implied an obligation to exercise the discretion in a reasonable
manner or implied a duty of good faith in the exercise of the
discretion.66  In theory, these are two separate standards, al-
though not all courts treat them as distinct.  If the contract does
not expressly convey complete discretion to one party, or if “it is
practicable to determine whether a reasonable person in the po-
sition of the obligor would be satisfied, an interpretation is pre-
ferred under which the condition occurs if such a reasonable
person in the position of the obligor would be satisfied.”67
If the express terms of the contract make it clear that one party
is to have complete discretion, or if the discretion is based on
subjective factors or individual judgment, then most courts have
stated that the contract terms should be enforced and that party
should not be required to act reasonably in exercising that discre-
tion.  Instead, the party must act in good faith.68  Thus, the duty
of good faith is limited to contracts in which a party has sole dis-
cretion or in which the parties intend for the discretion to be ex-
ercised based upon subjective factors.  Although courts assert
65 See Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1958) (“[I]f one of the promises
leaves a party free to perform or to withdraw from the agreement at his own un-
restricted pleasure, the promise is deemed illusory and it provides no considera-
tion.”).  This assumes that there is no other consideration sufficient to support the
contract.  Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 267,
278 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“[W]hen the contract is adequately supported by adequate
consideration regardless of the discretionary power, there is no need to impose a
covenant of good faith in order to create mutuality.”).  For example, a clause that
allows one party to terminate a contract “at any time and for any reason” on thirty-
day notice is enforceable without implying a covenant of good faith because the
thirty-day notice requirement is sufficient consideration for the other party’s
promise.
66 See Storek, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278 (“[T]he courts will imply a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to limit that discretion in order to create a binding contract and
avoid a finding that the promise is illusory.”).
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1981); see also Storek, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 280 (“In the absence of a specific expression in the contract or one im-
plied from the subject matter, the preference of the law is for the less arbitrary
reasonable person standard.”); Mattei, 330 P.2d at 626-27 (“[I]n those contracts
where the condition calls for satisfaction as to commercial value or quality, operative
fitness, or mechanical utility, dissatisfaction cannot be claimed arbitrarily, unreason-
ably, or capriciously . . . .”).
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 cmt. a (1981); Mattei, 330 P.2d
at 627 (“Where the question is one of judgment, the promisor’s determination that
he is not satisfied, when made in good faith, has been held to be a defense to an
action on the contract.”).
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that the reasonableness and good faith concepts are distinct,69 it
is often unclear from the language in the courts’ opinions how or
if good faith differs from reasonableness.70
Whether the standard is objective or subjective, the implied
covenant of good faith in these cases is consistent with the par-
ties’ intent because the parties presumably intended to enter into
an enforceable bargain, and without the covenant the promises
would be illusory.  Additionally, it is unlikely that a party would
ever intend to give the other party absolute and unbounded dis-
cretion without any corresponding obligations.  In this context, it
may be fair to say that the implied covenant merely reflects a
term that was so obvious to the parties that its inclusion was
unnecessary.71
However, some courts have expanded the good-faith doctrine
to apply when a party has some, but not total, discretion with
respect to any aspect of the contract and when the covenant is
not necessary to provide consideration to support the contract.
These contracts do not require an implied covenant of good faith
in order to be enforceable, nor are they always consistent with
the terms of the parties’ bargain.  Nonetheless, courts have in-
69 Storek, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279 (noting that when a contract includes a satisfac-
tion clause two different tests are recognized — good faith and reasonableness: “In
this context, reasonableness and good faith are distinct concepts.”).
70 Compliance with the reasonableness standard requires that the party not act
arbitrarily or capriciously, or in a manner “lacking in evidentiary support.” Id.  “A
lack of good faith, on the other hand, suggests a moral quality, such as dishonesty,
deceit, or unfaithfulness to duty.” Id.  In many cases, courts appear to find that the
discretion-exercising party has acted in good faith if the court determines that the
party exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner. See, e.g., Publix Super Mkts.,
Inc. v. Wilder Corp., 876 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
Publix’s exercise of discretion was “commercially reasonable and not arbitrary and
thus did not constitute a breach of good faith, as a matter of law”); Sepe v. City of
Safety Harbor, 761 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that implied
covenant of good faith applied to City’s exercise of “sole discretion” and stating that
“[u]nless no reasonable party in the position of the City would have made the same
discretionary decision the City made, it seems unlikely that its decision would violate
the covenant of good faith in this context.”).  One court declared that the covenant
of good faith “is not a general reasonableness requirement,” but acknowledged that
“[r]easonableness does play a role in the good faith analysis—but only as evidence
of subjective intent to undermine fulfillment of the contract.”  Schell v. Lifemark
Hosps., 92 S.W.3d 222, 230-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).  According to the Missouri
Court of Appeals, good faith requires “behavior on behalf of the parties that com-
ports with the ‘reasonable expectations of the parties’ but only in light of [the par-
ties’] purposes in contracting.” Id. at 231.
71 See Continental Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66, 80 (N.M.
1993).
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creasingly held that the covenant should be applied.72
The decision in Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc.73 illustrates the pit-
falls of implying a duty of good faith in these cases.  Locke en-
tered into an agreement with Warner Bros. that was
characterized as a three-year “non-exclusive first look deal.”74
Locke was obligated to submit any picture that she was inter-
ested in developing to Warner Bros. for approval or rejection at
Warner Bros.’ sole discretion before she submitted it to any other
studio.75  In exchange, Locke received $250,000 per year.76  In
addition, the contract included a “pay or play” directing provi-
sion that gave Warner Bros. the option of either using Locke to
direct pictures or paying her a $750,000 fee.77  Warner Bros. re-
jected all of Locke’s submissions during the contract period and
declined to use her to direct any pictures; however, it did pay the
$1.5 million required under the contract.78  Despite receiving the
payments, Locke filed suit alleging breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith.79  According to Locke, Warner Bros. never
intended to develop any of her projects or hire her to direct any
films.80  Instead, the studio entered into the agreement to help
Clint Eastwood—one of the studio’s biggest stars—settle a law-
suit with Locke, and it intended to refuse to work with her out of
deference to Eastwood.81
The court imposed the duty of good faith even though the
promise to pay the $1.5 million was sufficient consideration to
support the contract, and it held that Warner Bros. could have
breached its duty of good faith by rejecting Locke’s proposals
without evaluating them.82
72 See, e.g., Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1445 (7th Cir.
1992); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Colo. 1995).
73 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
74 Id. at 922.
75 Id.  If the project was rejected by Warner, Locke was free to “shop” or present
the project to other studios or production companies. See Brief of Respondent
Warner Bros., 1997 WL 33563078, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. App.).
76 Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 922-23.
80 Id. at 922.
81 Locke and Eastwood had been involved in a relationship for several years. Id.
When it ended, Locke sued Eastwood. Id.  Locke claimed that Eastwood secured
the agreement with Warner Bros. for Locke in exchange for her dropping her case
against Eastwood. Id.
82 Id. at 926.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 22 21-OCT-05 9:24
248 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
Unquestionably, Warner was entitled to reject Locke’s work
based on its subjective judgment . . . .  However, bearing in
mind the requirement that subjective dissatisfaction must be
an honestly held dissatisfaction, the evidence raises a triable
issue as to whether Warner breached its agreement with Locke
by not considering her proposals on their merits.83
In other words, the studio could not simply decide for any rea-
son to reject the proposals and pay the money.  It could do so
only if it was dissatisfied with the quality of the proposals.  Essen-
tially, the court read into the contract a “satisfaction” require-
ment that was not included in the language of the contract
itself.84  If the studio had agreed to develop all projects that it
determined, in its sole discretion, were acceptable or marketable,
then Locke would have been justified in expecting the studio to
at least review each proposed project.  However, the contract
contained no such clause.  The studio promised either to develop
her projects or pay her $1.5 million, and it chose to pay the
money.85  By holding that the studio had an obligation to do
more, the court imposed different and more burdensome obliga-
tions than were included in the contract itself based on the
court’s understanding of and belief regarding the parties’ expec-
tations and motivations in entering into the contract.86
The court distinguished Locke from Third Story Music, Inc. v.
Waits87 on the assertion that the Locke contract “gave Warner
discretion with respect to developing Locke’s projects,” whereas
in Third Story Music, “the agreement expressly provided that
Warner Communications had the right to refrain from marketing
83 Id.
84 Id. at 927.
85 Examination of Locke’s brief to the court of appeals reveals that Locke’s ex-
pectation that the studio would use her for future projects was based on conversa-
tions with and representations from persons directly and indirectly affiliated with
Warner Bros. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, 1996 WL 33454719, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct.
App.).  If these statements could have been attributed to Warner Bros., then Locke
may have had a claim for fraudulent inducement or misrepresentation, or the state-
ments may have been evidence regarding the proper interpretation of the contract.
To the extent that the statements were made after the contract was entered into,
they are irrelevant and could not be the basis for any reasonable expectations re-
garding Warner Bros.’ performance.
86 Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926 (accepting Locke’s assertion that “the value in
the subject development deal was not merely the guaranteed payments under the
agreement, but also the opportunity to direct and produce films and earn additional
sums, and most importantly, the opportunity to promote and enhance a career.”).
87 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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the Waits recordings.”88  The court’s distinction is unpersuasive
because the word “discretion” was not used in Locke’s contract
and the contract expressly gave the studio the right to approve or
reject her submissions.89  The bargain that the parties struck was
that the studio would either develop Locke’s projects or pay her
the stipulated amount.  This was a valid bargain supported by
consideration.
Instead, the court enforced an agreement to consider and eval-
uate projects for development, and then either develop the
projects or pay the stipulated amount.  This gave Locke what she
expected, although it was more than that for which she bar-
gained.  Therein lies the danger of implying a duty of good faith
in otherwise enforceable, unambiguous contracts.  Rather than
enforce the bargain made and agreed to by the parties, courts
interpret any grant of discretion as a license to inquire into the
parties’ expectations and intentions.
Undertaking such a task after the parties’ relationship has de-
teriorated, when each is likely to assert, in retrospect, expecta-
tions consistent with their current legal position—regardless of
whether those same expectations and motivations existed at the
time of contract formation—is difficult at best.  The more troub-
ling possibility is that the parties may not have disclosed their
expectations or motivations to each other and, indeed, their rea-
sonable expectations may be in direct conflict with one another.
In that situation, the court must choose and will necessarily en-
force the contract in a way that is inconsistent with the reasona-
ble expectations of at least one party.
In Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp.,90 Beraha entered into
an exclusive license agreement with Baxter under which Baxter
would develop and sell biopsy needles designed and patented by
Beraha.91  Baxter paid Beraha $50,000 for advance royalties and
was obligated to pay royalties of 3.5%.92  After several years,
Beraha became dissatisfied with Baxter’s efforts and sued, alleg-
ing breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.93  Although Baxter had provided some assurances that it
would “do its best” to develop and market the needle, the court
88 Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 927.
89 Id. at 922.
90 956 F.2d 1436 (7th Cir. 1992).
91 Id. at 1437.
92 Id. at 1438.
93 Id. at 1439.
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held that those promises were too vague and indefinite to be en-
forced as an obligation to use its “best efforts.”94
However, the court did hold that Baxter had discretion under
the contract with respect to developing and marketing the nee-
dle, and it was obligated by the covenant of good faith to exercise
that discretion reasonably.95  While it is true that the contract did
not specify a level of effort required by Baxter, Baxter’s obliga-
tions were clear: it had to pay the $50,000 fee up front and a
percentage of the net sales.96  Beraha expressly declined to in-
clude a minimum annual royalty in the contract.97  He wanted to
include a provision requiring Baxter to use its best efforts to mar-
ket and develop the needle, but signed the agreement even after
noting that no such provision was included.98  In fact, Baxter de-
clined to give assurances of the level of effort to be used when
Beraha specifically asked it to do so before he signed.99
On these facts, it is clear that Beraha wanted to include a mini-
mum required level of effort in the contract, but that Baxter did
not and Beraha was aware of this fact.  Thus, the parties’ agree-
ment deliberately failed to include a requirement that Baxter use
a specified level of effort in developing and marketing the nee-
dle.  Instead, the parties agreed to a larger lump sum payment up
front.  The court’s holding that Baxter’s discretion gave rise to a
duty to use reasonable effort was contrary to the written agree-
ment and the evident intent of the parties.  It was also unneces-
sary to imply a duty of good faith in that context because Baxter
did not have total discretion to determine whether Beraha would
receive any compensation under the contract.100  Baxter was ob-
ligated to pay $50,000 regardless of whether it ever developed or
sold a single needle.  This gave Baxter incentive (but not a man-
94 Id. at 1440.
95 Id. at 1444.
96 Id. at 1438-39.
97 Id. at 1438.  An earlier version of the proposed contract included a lower up
front payment, but included a minimum annual royalty payment of $10,000 after the
first anniversary of the agreement. Id.
98 Id. at 1438-39.
99 “At first Beraha refused to sign the . . . agreement because it contained no best
efforts provision.  He telephoned his contacts at Baxter . . . [but] received no repre-
sentation concerning the specific level of effort that would be made.” Id.  Neverthe-
less, Beraha signed the agreement without the best-efforts clause. Id. at 1439.
Beraha alleged that one of the Baxter executives promised to send him a letter, but
it is unclear what the promised letter was supposed to say. Id.  The letter that was
eventually sent fell short of promising to use “best efforts.” Id.
100 Thus, Baxter’s promise was not illusory.
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date) to develop the needle and make it as profitable as possible.
Beraha took this payment in hopes that Baxter would do so, but
he knew before signing the contract that Baxter might not.  He
signed the agreement anyway and should have been held to the
bargain that he made.
Implying a covenant of good faith in a contract granting sole
discretion to one party is prudent to the extent that it is consis-
tent with parties’ intent to enter into a binding contract.  How-
ever, when the duty is implied whenever a party has any
discretion, and when the contract is otherwise unambiguous and
enforceable, it can be used to modify the parties’ agreement or to
impose obligations inconsistent with the agreement.  In those cir-
cumstances, the implied covenant does more harm than good.
III
NO IMPLIED COVENANT IN EVERY CONTRACT
The implied covenant of good faith is unnecessary in many
contracts.  Its inclusion may be harmless in most cases because
parties will generally behave in ways that are consistent with gen-
eral notions of good faith of their own accord.101  However, as
long as it exists in every contract, and as long as there is no work-
able definition of good faith to guide (and restrain) parties or
courts, it is a tool that can be used to alter the parties’ bargain,
rights, and obligations.
The same previously discussed problems posed by applying the
duty of good faith in discretionary contracts exist and may be
multiplied when the duty of good faith is incorporated into every
contract.  With respect to discretionary contracts, the duty of
good faith can be limited to the parties’ exercise of discretion.  In
jurisdictions where every contract has an implied covenant of
good faith, the duty of good faith applies to every aspect of per-
formance.  Consequently, courts face the same difficulty of at-
tempting to assess the parties’ agreement and reasonable
expectations, but must make that assessment in a variety of con-
texts, depending upon which aspect of performance is alleged to
have been done in bad faith.  This makes it difficult for courts to
101 Aside from behaving honorably or reasonably for moral reasons, parties may
be concerned with their business reputation, future business relationship with the
same contracting party, or fear of extra-contractual sanctions (such as filing a com-
plaint with the Better Business Bureau or generating negative publicity).  In other
cases, performance of the contract as written is beneficial to all parties.
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develop a coherent yet comprehensive conceptualization of the
duty of good faith.  Predictably, it is even more difficult for par-
ties to know what obligations and restrictions are imposed by the
implied covenant of good faith.
The difficulty of defining good faith is by no means a new
problem.  In many jurisdictions, there is no single statement of
what the duty of good faith requires.  However, there are a few
conceptualizations that have gained more or less general accept-
ance.  In many jurisdictions, the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing “embraces a pledge that ‘neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.’”102
While most courts agree that the duty of good faith does not in-
clude obligations that conflict with the express terms of the con-
tract, many hold that it does “encompass ‘any promises which a
reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justi-
fied in understanding were included.’”103  Some courts have in-
terpreted this language to mean that the implied covenant of
good faith imposes restrictions on parties not included in the
agreement.104  Consequently, parties must refrain from taking ac-
tions not prohibited by the contract, and perhaps not even men-
tioned, if those actions might prevent the other party from
enjoying the anticipated “fruits of the contract” or interfere with
the other party’s “reasonable expectations.”105
Still other jurisdictions adopt the approach advocated by Pro-
fessor Robert S. Summers, in which good faith is defined as an
“excluder.”106  According to Professor Summers, good faith is a
102 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 773 N.E.2d 496, 500
(N.Y. 2002) (quoting Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 N.E.2d 289, 291 (1995)); see
also, e.g., De La Concha, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 849 A.2d 382, 388 (Conn. 2004)
(describing the implied covenant of good faith as a requirement that “neither party
do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agree-
ment”) (quoting Gaudio v. Griffin Health Servs. Corp., 733 A.2d 197, 221 (Conn.
1999)).
103 511 West 232nd Owners Corp., 773 N.E.2d at 500-01 (quoting Rowe v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1978)).
104 Use of the covenant of good faith in this manner goes far beyond the gap-filler
function discussed with approval in Part II.C. because instead of implying terms that
all parties actually believed were a part of the contract (but were so obvious that
inclusion was not necessary), the court implies terms that a reasonable person might
expect to be included.
105 These two conceptualizations are closely related and are sometimes used
interchangeably.
106 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 201.
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term “without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and
serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad
faith.”107  Others have embraced the notion of good faith as
prohibiting one party from seeking to recapture opportunities
forgone during contract formation,108 or judge performance
based on motive.109  Many jurisdictions employ some hybrid ver-
sion incorporating elements of more than one of these
approaches.110
An examination of the ways in which courts have applied the
duty of good faith using these conceptualizations illustrates their
inadequacy in providing guidance to parties seeking to under-
stand their rights and obligations under their contracts.  It also
highlights the degree to which courts have used these vague defi-
nitions to impose obligations and curtail the rights of parties in
ways that are inconsistent with the parties’ actual bargain.  Use
of the covenant of good faith in this manner is inappropriate and
should be abandoned.
A. Reasonable Expectations or “Fruits” of the Contract
Party expectations are an integral part of contract law.  Dam-
ages are awarded to protect the parties’ expectation interests.111
But expectation damages are intended to give the non-breaching
party the “benefit of the bargain” and put him or her “in as good
a position as he would have been in had the contract been per-
formed.”112  Thus, expectations and resulting damages are as-
sessed based upon the terms of the contract, not the parties’
subjective expectations.  In other words, the bargain defines the
expectations and associated damages.
However, courts in some jurisdictions have used the implied
covenant of good faith to enforce parties’ subjective expectations
107 Id.
108 See Burton, supra note 4, at 377-78.
109 See Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1129 (N.J. 2001).
110 See, e.g., Tufankjian v. Rockland Trust Co., 782 N.E.2d 1, 4-6 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003) (defining good faith as “the understanding between the parties ‘that neither
party shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of
the other party to receive the fruits of the contract’”  (quoting Anthony’s Pier Four,
Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 820 (Mass. 1991), but finding a breach of the
duty because the defendant sought to “recapture opportunities forgone on con-
tracting as determined by [defendant’s] reasonable expectations.” (quoting
Anthony’s Pier Four, 583 N.E.2d at 821)).
111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981).
112 Id. § 344(a).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 28 21-OCT-05 9:24
254 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
in ways that redefine or modify the parties’ bargain.  Instead of
viewing the implied covenant as an interpretive aid or gap-filler,
these courts have implied obligations that add to or even contra-
dict the obligations spelled out in the parties’ agreement in the
name of fulfilling the parties’ (or at least one party’s) reasonable
expectations.  This conceptualization of the good-faith duty is
most troubling when it is interpreted in a way that requires one
party to refrain from exercising rights expressly granted in the
contract because exercising those rights is determined to be con-
trary to the other party’s reasonable expectations.
Requiring a party to take on obligations not included in the
contract, or to refrain from activities not prohibited by the con-
tract, solely for the benefit of the other party, is unreasonable
and imposes duties more appropriate to parties in a fiduciary re-
lationship than those in an arm’s-length transaction.113  However,
a contract is not necessarily an agreement to enter into a rela-
tionship or even pursue a common purpose.  In many cases, it is
merely an assignment of rights and responsibilities between par-
ties, each of whom have their own purpose and objectives in
mind.  The parties may agree upon terms because those terms
meet their respective needs, not because they further some com-
mon goal.  Treating parties’ expectations as though they are
terms of the contract ignores these facts.  Moreover, expecta-
tions, as opposed to express obligations, are not always easy to
discern with accuracy.  Indeed, based on the parties’ bargain, it
may be impossible to distinguish between what a party reasona-
bly expected and what that party hoped to achieve or accomplish.
In Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc.,114 Emerson ac-
cused Orion of breaching the implied covenant of good faith in
an agreement under which Orion was licensed to distribute
goods manufactured by Emerson to Wal-Mart stores.115  The
Third Circuit noted that the obligation of good faith has been
defined in New Jersey to mean that “neither party shall do any-
thing which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right
of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.”116  The
113 See Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th
Cir. 1990) (“Parties to a contract are not each others’ fiduciaries; they are not bound
to treat customers with the same consideration reserved for their families.”).
114 253 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2001).
115 Id. at 161.
116 Id. at 170 (quoting Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587
(N.J. 1997)).
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court interpreted this to require an inquiry into the parties’ rea-
sonable expectations (their “expectation interests”).117
Under the license agreement, Orion was required to make
minimum annual royalty payments of $4 million, regardless of
how many products it distributed.118  Sales of Emerson-brand
goods declined during the three-year term of the agreement, al-
legedly due to a deliberate effort by Orion to convince Wal-Mart
to purchase goods manufactured by Orion instead of Emerson
goods.119  Emerson claimed that Orion deliberately failed to
market Emerson goods to Wal-Mart and that this constituted a
breach of its good-faith duty, even though Orion complied with
its obligation to make the annual $4 million royalty payments.120
Emerson claimed that it expected more than the $4 million
payments.
Emerson’s Chairman and CEO . . . stated in his deposition
that “[w]e thought we might get six or $8 million a year.  We
actually did at one point figure we might get six and three-
quarters to seven and a quarter million dollars a year.  That
was our vision at the time for this license.”121
According to Emerson, Orion’s actions destroyed Emerson’s
expectation interest and breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.122
The Third Circuit held that Emerson raised a genuine issue of
material fact precluding summary judgment on the good-faith
claim.123  The court, in effect, held that Orion could be liable for
117 Id. at 170-71.
118 Id. at 166.
119 Id. at 163.
120 Id. at 171.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 172.  Earlier in the opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding that no obligation to use “reasonable efforts” should be implied because “‘a
required annual payment of this magnitude constitutes sufficient non-contingent
consideration such that the equitable purposes served by inferring a best efforts
clause are not implicated in the situation.’” Id. at 166 (quoting Emerson Radio
Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (D.N.J. 1999)).  It is unclear why
equity would not require a best efforts clause but would require a good-faith
obligation.
123 Id. at 172.  The court also reversed the summary judgment in favor of Orion on
the issue of whether Orion breached an express provision of the contract. Id. at 175.
The License Agreement provided that Emerson granted Orion an exclusive “non-
transferable license to utilize and exploit the Licensed Marks.” Id. at 163.  Emerson
argued that this language imposed an obligation on Orion to use “reasonable ef-
forts” or “due diligence” in marketing Emerson’s products. Id.  The Third Circuit
held that the phrase was ambiguous and that the issue must go to the jury in order to
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performance that failed to live up to Emerson’s expectations,
even though those “expectations” were in direct conflict with the
contract terms.124  In reality, Emerson’s expectations were no
more than hopes or optimistic predictions.  There was no indica-
tion that Orion in any way fostered those hopes or led Emerson
to believe that it would guarantee royalty payments in excess of
$4 million.  Nonetheless, it faced possible liability for failure to
perform in accordance with Orion’s expectations.  Orion argua-
bly acted despicably, but it did not breach its non-exclusive con-
tract.125  Emerson knew Orion manufactured competing goods,
and it seems reasonable to expect Orion to try to develop the
market for its own products.
This case illustrates the danger of including a duty of good
faith based on party expectations.  In this way, courts such as the
Third Circuit use the implied covenant of good faith to elevate
the parties’ expectations above their agreement. Parties have the
opportunity to make certain that the other party’s performance
meets their expectations by drafting contracts consistent with
those expectations.  Emerson could have included an exclusivity
provision in the contract restricting or prohibiting Orion from
selling its own brand to Wal-Mart during the length of the con-
tract, but it failed to do so.  After the agreement has been
formed, parties should only reasonably expect performance that
is consistent with the agreement.  Otherwise, the implied cove-
nant of good faith becomes a tool to rewrite the agreement after
performance is complete to reflect what one party should have
said, but did not.
Moreover, there may be disagreement about what expecta-
tions are reasonable in a given set of circumstances.  Most nota-
bly, some courts have found a breach of the implied duty of good
faith even when the party is merely exercising rights expressly
granted under the contract.126  Under this conceptualization of
determine the proper interpretation. Id. at 165.  Relying on contract interpretation
to establish Orion’s obligations is preferable to relying on the duty of good faith
because it looks to the intent of the parties as expressed in their agreement rather
than creating obligations outside of or inconsistent with their bargain.
124 See id. at 171-72.
125 There was some indication that the defendants had a “secret intent to deci-
mate Emerson’s relationship with Wal-Mart” and actively sought to conceal this in-
tent from Emerson while pretending to help Emerson. Id. at 172.  If Orion actively
misled Emerson regarding its intent, then Emerson might have been able to sue for
fraud or misrepresentation.
126 See, e.g., Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 588 (N.J. 1997)
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good faith, it apparently is unreasonable to expect compliance
with and enforcement of the contract terms if, in the opinion of
the factfinder, the motivation for or the result of exercising con-
tractual rights is determined to be inequitable or otherwise
unfair.
Relying on expectations, even when those expectations are
contrary to the contract terms, is inconsistent with the purpose of
contracting.  If parties are to be bound by expectations, then
there is no need for binding agreements.  The point of agreeing
on terms is to ensure that all have a common understanding of
their rights and obligations.  Expectations may never be dis-
cussed or disclosed.  If liability is based on expectations, then
parties should be on notice of that fact at the time of contract
formation so that those expectations may be enunciated and
clarified.
In Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin,127 the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment based on a jury finding that Amoco
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
setting rental prices for the service stations of its independent
retail dealers that were inconsistent with the dealers’ “reasonable
expectations.”128  While the lease agreement set a specific rental
rate for the first year, Amoco had the right to modify the formula
for determining the rental amount each year thereafter, provided
that it gave the dealer ninety-day notice of the change.129  If dis-
satisfied with the rental amount, the dealer had the right to ter-
minate the lease upon fifteen-day written notice.130
During the course of the parties’ relationship, Amoco changed
the method it used to calculate rent.131  Although the dealers
agreed to pay the new amounts, they were evidently unaware of
(“[A] party to a contract may breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in performing its obligations even when it exercises an express and uncondi-
tional right to terminate.”).
127 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995).
128 Id. at 499.
129 Id. at 497 n.4.
130 Id. at 497.
131 Amoco moved from a rate that was based on the sale of gasoline at a particu-
lar station to a method of calculation that was based on the asset value of the station.
Id. at 495.  The new Investment Value Report (IVR) formula was calculated by ad-
ding eight percent of the capital improvements on the property, a maintenance
charge, actual real estate and property taxes for the previous year, rent increment
for the next fiscal year, and a uniform charge for each service bay at the station. Id.
at 496.
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the precise formula used to determine the new rental amount.132
Specifically, they did not realize that the formula included a
charge for capital improvements (including the service bays) and
a uniform charge for each service bay.133  The dealers alleged
that the lease gave Amoco discretion to set the rate, and that this
gave rise to an obligation that Amoco exercise this discretion in
good faith.134  They claimed that Amoco breached the duty of
good faith by double-charging them for the service bays.135
The Colorado Supreme Court agreed that Amoco retained dis-
cretion to modify the rental amount and that the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing required Amoco to exercise
the discretion in good faith.136  Specifically, the court approved
the trial court’s instruction to the jury to “enforce the agreements
according to the reasonable expectations of the parties.”137  The
jury found that by including two charges for the service bays in
its calculation of rent, Amoco “did not perform the contracts in
accordance with the dealers’ reasonable expectations.”138  The
supreme court affirmed this finding, noting that “the dealers
never agreed to be charged twice for any goods or services under
the lease agreement.  The dealers were justified in expecting that,
in determining the appropriate rent, Amoco would not charge
double for any one element of the calculation.”139
The opinion in this case is noteworthy in several respects.
First, there was no finding that the rental amounts charged by
Amoco were unconscionable, or even unfair.  The dealers agreed
132 See id. at 499.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 497.
136 “Under the agreements, Amoco retained discretion to modify the monthly
rental amount.” Id. at 499.  As an initial matter, the propriety of the finding that the
lease gave Amoco discretion to set the rental price is questionable.  Unlike cases in
which one party has sole discretion to set the price (or, as in this case, rent) after
contract formation and the other party has no right to object, in this case the dealers
were not obligated to pay the modified rent. See id. at 497 n.4.  If they believed the
amount to be too high, they had the right to terminate the contract.  They were only
obligated to pay the rent specified in the contract for the first year. Id. Thus, it is
more accurate to say that Amoco had discretion to propose a new rental rate, which
could be accepted or rejected by the dealers. See id.
137 Id. at 497.  The jury was informed that “Colorado law provides that each con-
tract has an implied covenant that parties shall act in good faith and deal fairly” and
“that the law requires each party to a contract to act in such a manner that each
party will attain their reasonable expectations under the contract.” Id. at 499.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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to pay the modified rental amounts for three years before they
knew the formula behind the amounts.140  Obviously, the dealers’
complaint was that they were ignorant of the formula, not the
actual rental price.  Moreover, there was no evidence that
Amoco lied to the dealers about the formula or that the dealers
ever asked how the rental amount was calculated.
But the formula used by Amoco should have been inconse-
quential.  Absent an obligation imposed by the contract, Amoco
had no obligation to explain the formula used to calculate the
rental amounts.  The dealers’ true complaint was that the rental
amount was too high, but that complaint does not implicate the
duty of good faith as defined by the court.  The jury was in-
structed to enforce the agreement according to the parties’ rea-
sonable expectations,141 but there can be no doubt that the rental
amount was clearly within the dealers’ reasonable expectations
since it was disclosed to them and they accepted it.  If they be-
lieved it to be excessive, they had the right to terminate the lease
or attempt to negotiate a lower rate.
Even assuming that Amoco had an obligation to act reasona-
bly when exercising its discretion to propose new rental amounts,
the internal thought processes that it used to arrive at the rental
rate were simply irrelevant.  If the amount was reasonable, then
Amoco’s obligation was fulfilled.  This point becomes clearer
when one considers that, presumably, had Amoco simply
changed the formula but still arrived at the same price, it would
not have been liable.142  Imposing liability because the formula
failed to meet the dealers’ expectations unnecessarily and un-
wisely expands the parties’ obligations.  According to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, parties not only have a duty to include
terms that meet the reasonable expectations of the other party,
but also they must do so for reasons and based upon considera-
tions that are within the reasonable expectations of the other
party.  Indeed, it becomes a duty of full disclosure in negotiations
instead of good-faith performance.143
140 See id.  As noted above, the dealers had the right to terminate the lease agree-
ments if the new rental amounts were deemed unacceptable. See id. at 497 n.4.
141 Id. at 499.
142 For instance, had Amoco’s formula included a higher percentage for the capi-
tal charge but eliminated the charge for each service bay, thus arriving at the same
result, the dealers would have had no basis for complaint.
143 “The duty of honesty, of good faith even expansively conceived, is not a duty
of candor.”  Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Not all courts have embraced the view that good faith protects
expectations contrary to the contract terms.  For example, Taylor
Equipment, Inc. v. John Deere Co. involved a contract between
John Deere and one of its retail industrial equipment dealers,
Midcon.144  The contract stated that Midcon could not assign its
dealership “without the prior written consent” of John Deere.145
Midcon sought John Deere’s consent to assign its dealership to
Interstate Companies of Minnesota (“Interstate”) and John
Deere refused Midcon’s request.146  Midcon later assigned the
dealership to two other dealers, with John Deere’s approval, at a
lower price than what Interstate had offered.147  Midcon then
sued John Deere, claiming that its refusal to consent to the as-
signment to Interstate was a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.148
John Deere’s stated reason for refusing consent was that Inter-
state had inadequate equity capital.149  Midcon claimed that this
reason was a pretext and that John Deere had a “secret plan” to
eliminate many of its small dealers by approving sales of dealer-
ships only to “key dealers.”150  According to Midcon, the goal
was to “rationalize” (or streamline) John Deere’s dealer net-
work.151  The dealers to which Midcon eventually sold its assets
were allegedly “key dealers.”152  The jury found that John Deere
had breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the trial
court denied John Deere’s motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and motion for new trial.153
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment.154  Fol-
144 98 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1197 (1997).
145 Id. at 1030.
146 Id.  The sale was necessitated by Midcon’s breach of an unrelated term of the
contract. Id.  Although the breach gave John Deere the right to terminate the con-
tract immediately, John Deere allowed Midcon to continue as a dealer in good
standing for a period of time while it sought to sell the business. Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.  The case was governed by the law of South Dakota, which recognized an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract. Id. at 1031.  The
South Dakota Supreme Court adopted the South Dakota Uniform Commercial
Code’s definition of good faith for all contracts: “honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.” Id. at 1032 (citing S.D. Codified Laws § 57A-1-201(19)
(1988)).





154 Id. at 1034.
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lowing the logic of prior South Dakota Supreme Court cases, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that Midcon’s implied covenant claim
should fail.
The purpose of the implied covenant is to honor the parties’
justified expectations . . . .  Midcon’s dealer contract granted
Deere an express, unrestricted right to disapprove a proposed
assignment of Midcon’s contract rights.  This contract term
gave Midcon no justified expectation that Deere was agreeing
to surrender its absolute right to choose Midcon’s successor.
Instead, the no-assignment-without-Deere-approval term pre-
served that right.155
As the Eighth Circuit noted, expectations are only justified when
they are consistent with the parties’ bargain.156
Each party should be able to act in their own best interests so
long as they comply with the terms of the contract and do not
interfere with the other party’s ability to perform under it.  Not
only is this consistent with the conceptualization of the contrac-
tual relationship as a set of finite, defined, mutually-agreed-upon
obligations, it relieves each party from having to investigate or
anticipate what the other party hopes to achieve or receive in
anticipated benefits under the contract.
When the evidence shows that both parties understood that
the contract included certain obligations, an implied covenant re-
flecting those obligations is in order.157  This is simply a matter of
contract interpretation.  However, when there is a dispute re-
garding the parties’ expectations, and the contract does not ines-
capably lead to a conclusion that one party’s expectations are
justified by the contract terms, parties should not be bound by an
155 Id. at 1033.  The court further noted that even if John Deere’s true reason for
refusing consent was to consolidate its dealerships, then that would be a legitimate
business reason that would not violate its duty of good faith. Id. at 1034.  Note that
this court could have implied the duty of good faith because this is a contract grant-
ing sole discretion to one party, thereby obligating John Deere to exercise that dis-
cretion reasonably.  The Eighth Circuit, however, apparently believed that the South
Dakota courts were willing to enforce contracts granting absolute discretion without
implying a duty of good faith. Id.  Even if such a duty had been implied, the court’s
discussion indicates it believed John Deere acted in good faith even though its ac-
tions were inconsistent with Midcon’s expectations. Id. (noting that Deere’s stated
reasons for disapproving the assignment were “legitimate business reasons”).
156 Id. at 1033.
157 For example, evidence of trade usage, course of dealing, and course of per-
formance will be relevant and admissible, and should be taken into consideration
when determining the parties’ obligations.  However, although such evidence is rele-
vant to determining the parties’ actual agreement and mutual understanding, it is
not relevant to determining the unexpressed expectations of one party.
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obligation of good faith to act in accordance with the first party’s
expectations.
While some benefits or “fruits” may be fairly obvious from the
subject matter of the contract itself, parties often have unstated
or tangential reasons for entering into a specific agreement on
particular terms.  If a party acts in furtherance of those undis-
closed goals and its actions conflict with the undisclosed goals of
the other party, a breach of the duty of good faith could be found
even though the party has complied with all of its contractual
obligations.  The only way to prevent such unintentional
breaches of the implied good-faith duty would be to disclose all
hopes, expectations, and anticipated benefits to the other party
before entering into the contract.  Such a requirement is unwise
and contrary to sound business practices.158
B. Obligation Not to Interfere
Conceptualizing the duty of good faith as a prohibition on ac-
tions that will negatively affect the expected benefits of the other
party is most attractive in contexts where one party’s actions pre-
vent or seriously impair the other party’s ability to perform
under the contract.  In essence, it prevents one party from inter-
fering with the other party’s performance.  If the person or entity
interfering with a party’s performance under the contract is not a
party to the contract, then a cause of action for tortious interfer-
ence with contract may be available.  However, most jurisdictions
do not allow a claim for tortious interference against a party to
the contract.  In other words, a party cannot interfere with its
own contract.  Courts have used the implied covenant of good
faith to provide a remedy when tortious interference is
unavailable.
In Electronics Store, Inc. v. Cellco Partnership, Electronics en-
tered into an agreement with Bell Atlantic to market Bell Atlan-
tic’s cellular phone services.159  Electronics could not offer any
services competitive to Bell Atlantic, nor was it allowed to solicit
existing Bell Atlantic purchasers or subscribers.160  Bell Atlantic
expressly reserved the right to market its cellular services
through its own employees in the same area in which Electronics
158 See Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that duty
of good faith is not a duty of candor).
159 732 A.2d 980, 983 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
160 Id.
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worked.161  Moreover, the agreement provided: “Nothing herein
shall restrict or prohibit Bell Atlantic from, in its sole discretion,
offering potential Subscribers in the Area, through its direct sales
force or otherwise, volume discounts, promotional offers, new or
modified price plans or any other special offers of [cellular
service].”162
Electronics filed suit after Bell Atlantic refused to allow Elec-
tronics to enroll members of the Cedar Point credit union, but
soon thereafter enrolled Cedar Point members through its direct
sales force.163  Electronics claimed that Bell Atlantic’s direct
sales force improperly interfered with its potential sales to Cedar
Point, causing Electronics to suffer lost commissions, lost reve-
nues, and lost sales.164  The complaint included allegations of
breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, tortious
interference with business relations, unfair competition, con-
certed refusal to deal, and civil conspiracy.165
Electronics appealed the judgment on the breach of contract,
tortious interference, unfair competition, and civil conspiracy
claims.166  The court of appeals summarily dismissed Electron-
ics’s tortious interference claims because Bell Atlantic—the al-
leged tortfeasor—was a party to the contract.167  Applying New
Jersey law, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of
Bell Atlantic on the breach of contract claim.  It held that a jury
should decide whether Bell Atlantic breached its implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing by refusing to quote a price for Cedar
Point, even though the contract expressly allowed Bell Atlantic,
in its sole discretion, to reject the enrollment of any subscriber,
and it was undisputed that Bell Atlantic had complied with the
express terms of the agreement.168
The court noted that Bell Atlantic’s direct sales agents were in
161 Id. (“Bell Atlantic reserves the right to market [cellular service] through its
own direct sales organization, or other Agents, resellers, or otherwise, in the
Area.”).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 984.  Bell Atlantic informed Electronics that the proposed pricing plan




167 Id. at 990-91.
168 Id. at 988 (“Read literally and technically, Bell Atlantic has fully performed its
obligations under the Agreement because the subscribers were not accepted by Bell
Atlantic.”).
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direct competition with Electronics and argued that the jury
could find that Bell Atlantic had acted dishonestly in telling Elec-
tronics that it “did not ‘do credit unions.’”169  Additionally, Bell
Atlantic may have breached the good-faith covenant by refusing
to quote a price to Electronics because one former Bell Atlantic
executive testified that he would not have instructed Electronics
not to submit the pricing request.170  According to the court, this
permitted an inference that Bell Atlantic’s refusal to quote a
price to Electronics was a self-serving tactic designed to allow
Bell Atlantic’s direct sales force to execute the contract with
Cedar Point at a lower cost to Bell Atlantic than if the deal had
been closed by Electronics.171
The commissions were the “fruits of the contract” to be
earned by Electronics.  When Bell Atlantic claimed that it did
not deal with credit unions and refused to authorize a price for
Electronics to offer to Cedar Point, and almost immediately
signed up Cedar Point itself, it may have deprived Electronics
of the “fruits” of the Agreement.172
Thus, the court effectively held that Bell Atlantic might be lia-
ble for breach of contract even though the express language of
the agreement allowed its actions.  In fact, at the time the con-
tract was signed, all parties were aware that Bell Atlantic’s direct
sales employees would be competing with Electronics for cus-
tomers, and that Bell Atlantic expressly reserved the right to
have its direct sales force offer “volume discounts, promotional
offers, new or modified price plans or any other special of-
fers.”173  Realistically, Electronics should have expected to lose
some of its potential commissions to Bell Atlantic’s direct sales
agents who might have been in a position to offer a better deal
than Electronics was authorized to offer.  Simply losing business
to its competition—in this case, Bell Atlantic—did not deprive
Electronics of the “fruit” of its bargain.
Instead, the heart of Electronics’s complaint was that Bell At-
lantic deliberately prevented Electronics from signing up Cedar
169 Id. at 989-90 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d
(1981)).
170 Id. at 990.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 983.  The court acknowledged that under the unambiguous terms of the
agreement “Bell Atlantic’s in-house sales department was not restricted by the con-
tract from marketing its service in the same area in which Electronics was authorized
to market Bell Atlantic’s services.” Id.
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Point so that it could obtain the business from its direct sales
force.  In essence, Bell Atlantic interfered with Electronics’s per-
formance of the contract.  However, as noted above, there is no
tort cause of action when a party interferes with its own con-
tract.174  There is, however, a well-settled principle of contract
law that one party cannot prevent the other party from perform-
ing under a contract.175
In some jurisdictions, this principle is considered a part of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.176  However, many jurisdic-
tions recognize it as a separate duty, including Texas, which does
not recognize the broader implied duty of good faith in every
contract.177  Under this principle, Bell Atlantic may have been
liable to Electronics for damages caused by Bell Atlantic’s ac-
tions in unjustly preventing Electronics from signing up Cedar
Point as a customer.  Application of this principle would honor
the parties’ bargain as expressed in their agreement while ensur-
ing a basic level of fair dealing between the parties.
C. Obligations Contrary or in Addition to Express
Contract Terms
Two of the most controversial issues related to the duty of
good faith are: (1) whether a party can violate the duty of good
faith if the party exercises a right expressly granted to it in the
contract; and (2) whether a party can breach the implied cove-
nant of good faith without breaching any express contract
174 Id. at 990.
175 See Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
176 “Under Maryland law, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is an implied term
in certain contracts . . . but this duty simply prohibits one party to a contract from
acting in such a manner as to prevent the other party from performing his obliga-
tions under the contract.” Id. at 531.  However, this principle was stated in the First
Restatement: “Prevention or hindrance by a party to a contract of any occurrence or
performance requisite under the contract for the creation or continuance of a right
in favor of the other party, or the discharge of a duty by him, is a breach of contract,
unless (a) the prevention or hindrance is caused or justified by the conduct of the
other party, or (b) the terms of the contract are such that the risk of such prevention
or hindrance as occurs has been assumed by the other party.” RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 315 (1932).  This principle is now subsumed in the good-
faith provision of the Second Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981).
177 See Dorsett v. Cross, 106 S.W.3d 213, 217 (Tex. App. 2003) (“When the obliga-
tion of a party to a contract depends upon a certain condition’s being performed,
and the fulfillment of the condition is prevented by the act of the other party, the
condition is considered fulfilled.”).
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term.178  Those who answer these questions in the affirmative ar-
gue that the duty of good faith is an obligation that is distinct
from and in addition to the express contract terms.  Thus, a party
can violate the implied covenant by performing in bad faith even
though the party has complied with all of the express contract
terms.  Likewise, a party may act in bad faith by exercising a right
granted to that party in the contract with an improper motive.
This interpretation of the implied duty of good faith is troub-
ling on both theoretical and practical levels.  From a theoretical
perspective, it is difficult to reconcile the notion that a party can
be in breach of a contract for taking actions consistent with the
contract terms with the notion that parties’ obligations are de-
fined by the bargain of the parties themselves.  If a party bargains
for certain rights, but cannot exercise those rights without fear of
liability, then the right is worthless and that party loses the bene-
fit of its bargain.  From a practical standpoint, no matter how
clear the language or how unambiguous the terms, a party cannot
rely on the agreement to determine its rights and obligations if
simply complying with the contract terms is not enough to avoid
a breach of contract action.
The view that a party can breach the implied covenant of good
faith by exercising an express contractual right is justified by the
argument that the duty of good faith enforces “community stan-
dards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”179  Thus, the duty
of good faith becomes a much more flexible, and therefore po-
tentially more attractive, tool of equity than other doctrines such
as unconscionability.  Although the doctrines may not apply in
precisely the same circumstances,180 the more compelling differ-
178 See Goren, supra note 5, at 259-60 (identifying question of whether breach of
implied covenant of good faith gives rise to an independent cause of action as one
problem that has arisen nationally in confronting the covenant). Compare, e.g., Sons
of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 588 (N.J. 1997) (“[A] party to a
contract may breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in perform-
ing its obligations even when it exercises an express and unconditional right to ter-
minate.”), with Adams v. G.J. Creel & Sons, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 84, 85 (S.C. 1995)
(“[T]here is no breach of an implied covenant of good faith where a party to a con-
tract has done what provisions of the contract expressly gave him the right to do.”).
179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed com-
mon purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because
they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”).
180 Unconscionability focuses on the fairness of contract terms at the time of con-
tract formation.  In contrast, the duty of good faith focuses on performance, and in
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ence between them is in the level of “unfairness” that must exist
before the court may intervene.
A contract or its terms may be objectively unfair or dispropor-
tionately beneficial or detrimental to one party without giving
rise to a claim of unconscionability.  Instead, according to the
traditional definition, a term is only unconscionable if it is “‘such
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other . . . .’”181  This is not a standard of reasonableness or fair-
ness, and courts have generally exercised great caution in cases
alleging unconscionability, striking down or refusing to enforce
such terms only in the most egregious instances.  To the extent
that courts require both procedural and substantive unconsciona-
bility, the distinction between good faith and unconscionability is
even clearer in light of the fact that courts can impose liability for
breach of the duty of good faith even absent a showing of any
defect or disparity of bargaining power at the time of contracting.
Consequently, the doctrine of good faith sets a lower standard.
Requiring compliance with general standards of fairness and rea-
sonableness implies that a court can find a breach of the duty
simply because one party’s performance of the contract is, in
some indefinable sense, unfair or unreasonable, even if that con-
duct is sanctioned by an agreement that was willingly and know-
ingly entered into by the other party.
Many courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have been critical
of this expansive view of good faith.182  In Kham & Nate’s Shoes
No. 2 v. First Bank, the bankruptcy judge subordinated a bank’s
claims based on the bank’s alleged “inequitable conduct.”183  The
debtor had sought financing to relieve a serious cash-flow prob-
the formulation currently under discussion, it can be breached even if the terms of
the agreement itself are not objectionable. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 (1981), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981).  However, this distinction is often illusory.  In good-faith cases where the
party has exercised a right under the contract but is found to have violated the duty
of good faith, the court is, in a sense, finding that the contract term that allowed the
party to exercise that right is unfair or inequitable—at least as applied to the facts of
that case.
181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (quoting Hume
v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889)).
182 See, e.g., L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997)
(applying Illinois law and noting that “[l]itigants may not seek to litigate issues of
‘good faith’ in lieu of abiding by explicit provisions of contracts.”).
183 908 F.2d 1351, 1353 (7th Cir. 1990).
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lem.184  The bank agreed to loan the money, but only after the
debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and the bank-
ruptcy judge granted an order giving the bank’s loan “super-pri-
ority.”185  The loan agreement allowed for cancellation on five-
day notice and stated “nothing provided herein shall constitute a
waiver of the right of the Bank to terminate financing at any
time.”186  The bank gave the debtor a $300,000 line of credit, but
less than two months after the agreement was signed, and after
the debtor had drawn only $75,000 on the credit line, the bank
notified the debtor that it would not make any further ad-
vances.187  The bankruptcy judge concluded that the bank acted
inequitably in terminating the line of credit.188
According to the judge, the “Bank was fully aware of the
Debtor’s plight, and its reliance upon the line of credit, and disre-
garded the consequences for the Debtor and its creditors.”189
The debtor claimed that the bank’s conduct was inequitable and
unfair, even though the bank complied with all of the contract
terms.190  The Seventh Circuit disagreed.  Writing for the court,
Judge Easterbrook explained:
[W]e are not willing to embrace a rule that requires partici-
pants in commercial transactions not only to keep their con-
tracts but also do ‘more’—just how much more resting in the
discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the situation years
later.  Contracts specify the duties of the parties to each other,
and each may exercise the privileges it obtained . . . . Unless
pacts are enforced according to their terms, the institution of
contract, with all the advantages private negotiation and
agreement brings, is jeopardized.191
Judge Easterbrook defined “inequitable conduct” in commer-
cial dealings as “breach plus some advantage-taking.”192  He
stressed that parties are entitled to enforce their agreements “to
184 Id.
185 Id. The loan had priority even over the administrative expenses of the bank-
ruptcy. Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1353-54.
188 Id. at 1354.
189 Id. at 1356.  When the bank refused to advance more funds, the debtor closed
its head office in a prominent Michigan Avenue location, and, according to the
debtor, the loss of this prestigious address made suppliers hesitant to deliver shoes
on credit. Id. at 1354.  The result was that the debtor closed three of its four stores,
including two in “ritzy locations.” Id.
190 Id. at 1356.
191 Id. at 1356-57.
192 Id. at 1357.
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the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading part-
ners.”193  He explained that the good-faith obligation is not a
substitute for compliance with negotiated terms, but is only “a
compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take oppor-
tunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contem-
plated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not
resolved explicitly by the parties.”194  It cannot be used to contra-
dict the terms of the contract.195
Judge Easterbrook’s definition, while more restrictive, reflects
a better understanding of the parties’ reasonable or justified ex-
pectations.  First and foremost, the parties can reasonably and
justifiably expect enforcement of their contract’s express terms.
Parties should feel confident that they will not incur liability for
exercising their express contractual rights or for failing to do
more than what is required under the contract.  Second, if the
contract is silent with respect to a matter that could not have
been contemplated when the contract was entered into, parties
can reasonably and justifiably expect the other party to act in
good faith with respect to that matter.
A party can only reasonably or justifiably expect conduct in
addition or contrary to the contract terms if the contract has been
modified, the contract or certain terms are unconscionable or vi-
olate a statute, the other party’s conduct constitutes a waiver of a
contractual right or obligation, the other party’s conduct gives
rise to an estoppel claim, or if the conduct involves taking oppor-
tunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contem-
plated by the parties when they entered into the agreement.
While this will certainly leave some parties disappointed and
wishing that they had been more careful in drafting their con-
tracts, the certainty and predictability of this approach make it
the more prudent option.  This is especially true in light of the
fact that the law does not require that contracts (or contracting
parties) be objectively “fair” or “equitable.”196
193 Id.
194 Id. This is consistent with use of the covenant of good faith as a gap-filler or
interpretive aid. See discussion supra Part II.C.  Approval of Judge Easterbrook’s
conceptualization of good faith should not be interpreted as approval (or disap-
proval) of the decision or application of the law in Kham.
195 Id.
196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) (“If the requirement
of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of . . . equivalence in the
values exchanged . . . or ‘mutuality of obligation.’”).
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D. Motive as Determining Factor
Some courts have made motive the (or at least a) determining
factor when deciding whether a party has performed in good
faith.197  According to these courts, a party may be liable for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith by exercising rights
expressly granted to it under the contract if the party’s motive is
deemed to be improper.198  In other words, the party’s contrac-
tual rights vary according to the party’s motive for exercising
them.
If a party is merely enforcing or exercising its rights under the
express terms of the contract, then motive should be irrele-
vant.199  Even if the party knows that the other party will be ad-
versely affected, and even if that is the desired result, there
should be no liability if the agreement clearly allows such action.
To hold otherwise is to require a party to relinquish bargained-
for rights solely for the benefit of the other party.  While it may
be socially desirable for a party to relinquish such rights if that
party is not thereby harmed (and many relinquishing parties will
do so voluntarily for a variety of reasons),200 to require such ac-
tion is to deprive a party of the benefit of their bargain and to
require altruism.201
When the inquiry is whether a party has exercised discretion in
good faith, the motive for the party’s actions may be relevant, but
only to the extent that it sheds light on whether the exercise of
discretion was reasonable, consistent with the parties’ reasonable
expectations, or not arbitrary or capricious.202  If the exercise of
197 See, e.g., Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1129 (N.J. 2001) (not-
ing “the importance of demonstrating bad motive in order to assert successfully a
claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”).
198 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1996).
199 See Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[E]ven after
you have signed a contract, you are not obliged to become an altruist toward the
other party and relax the terms if he gets into trouble in performing his bargain.
Otherwise mere difficulty of performance would excuse a contracting party—which
it does not.”) (citation omitted).
200 In many cases, parties will do so voluntarily in order to preserve a relationship,
create goodwill, preserve or increase their reputation in the community, or to en-
courage reciprocal benevolence in the future.
201 See Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Contract law does not require
parties to behave altruistically toward each other; it does not proceed on the philos-
ophy that I am my brother’s keeper.”).
202 See, e.g., Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1130 (“[A] party exercising its right to use discre-
tion in setting price under a contract breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing
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discretion was reasonable, then motive should be irrelevant.
Thus, a discretion-exercising party may set the date for perform-
ance under a contract at a point in time where it knows that the
other party will not be able to perform, so long as the discretion-
exercising party provides an objectively reasonable time for per-
formance that is consistent with the parties’ reasonable expecta-
tions at the time of contracting and is not arbitrary or capricious.
This is so even if the motive for setting the date is to force the
other party to breach.203  This approach may be unsettling, as it
appears to reward what may be termed undesirable behavior, but
it is simply enforcing the parties’ bargain.
E. If No Bad Faith, then Good Faith
Professor Summers first articulated this approach in his influ-
ential 1968 article.204  He posited that good faith was incapable of
precise definition and should instead be understood as prohibit-
ing various forms of “bad faith.”205  His hope was that the courts
would develop a body of case law that would define the contours
of good faith.206  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
adopted Professor Summers’ approach, declining to define good
faith, but including the “excluder analysis” in the comments,
along with Professor Summers’ list of examples of bad faith.207
Unfortunately, more than thirty-five years later, courts have
failed to live up to Professor Summers’ aspiration.
Some of the fault may lie with the examples listed in Professor
Summers’ article and Comment d to Restatement (Second) of
if that party exercises its discretionary authority arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capri-
ciously, with the objective of preventing the other party from receiving its reasona-
bly expected fruits under the contract.”); Dayan v. McDonald’s Corp., 466 N.E.2d
958, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“[T]he courts of this state have held that a party vested
with contractual discretion must exercise that discretion reasonably and with proper
motive, and may not do so arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with
the reasonable expectations of the parties.”).
203 Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., 970 F.2d at 280 (“The
law generally . . . does not provide remedies for spiteful conduct or refuse enforce-
ment of contractual provisions invoked out of personal nastiness.”) (citing Rideout
v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1889) (Holmes, J.)). The discretion-exercising party may
do so in order to take advantage of other business opportunities or to sever an un-
pleasant or unproductive relationship.  If the party’s actions and accompanying mo-
tives are tortious or violate some other contract doctrine, then, of course, the party
should face liability.
204 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 6, at 201.
205 Id.
206 Id. See Van Alstine, supra note 14, at 1250-51.
207 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d.
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Contracts section 205, since those examples can be more confus-
ing than enlightening.  Some of the alleged examples of bad faith,
such as willful rendering of imperfect performance, lack of dili-
gence, and slacking off, may constitute a breach of contract.  If
“imperfect” performance, lack of diligence, or slacking off result
in failure to comply with the contract terms, the performing party
is in breach and is liable for damages.  If it does not amount to a
breach, but is simply less than what was hoped for, it should not
be actionable.  If a certain level of performance is required, it
should be specified.208  Otherwise, a party should be free to di-
vert its efforts elsewhere if it will be more profitable or less bur-
densome, so long as this diversion does not violate the contract.
Defining “evasion of the spirit of the bargain” as bad faith is
troubling because it assumes that the “spirit” of an agreement
can be discerned, and because it ignores the fact that the parties
negotiate or agree to terms, not a general concept or “spirit.”  If
the parties agree to terms contrary to the “spirit” of the bargain,
the terms should prevail.  Moreover, a party should be allowed to
take advantage of opportunities that arise after contracting that
are contrary to the spirit but consistent with the terms.  Indeed,
the circumstances may change for both parties in such a way that
the original motivations for entering into the agreement are no
longer valid, but are replaced by new and different motivations
and expectations.  To the extent that this can be done without
breaching the contract, it should be allowed.
Other examples of “bad faith,” such as interference with or
failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance, can be
dealt with by other contract doctrines or can exist separately as
independently defined and recognized duties.209  This leaves
“abuse of the power to specify terms” as the sole example of per-
formance that requires an implied obligation of good faith.  As
discussed above, use of the implied covenant of good faith in this
context is not contested.
F. Forgone Opportunities
Few courts appear to rely expressly and exclusively upon Pro-
208 In the case of an open price or quantity term, courts hold that a reasonable
price or reasonable quantity is required. See U.C.C. § 2-305 (2001); S.C. Gray, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 286 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Burnside Air Condi-
tioning & Heating, Inc. v. T.S. Young Corp., 113 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tex. App. 2003).
209 See Van Alstine, supra note 14, at 1253 n.118, and discussion infra Part V.
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fessor Burton’s conceptualization of good faith, which holds that
a party breaches the implied covenant when it uses its discretion
“to recapture forgone opportunities.”210  Courts may be reluctant
to rely on this conceptualization because it requires them to de-
termine what opportunities a party gave up when entering into a
contract.  This undertaking seems even more difficult than identi-
fying the parties’ reasonable expectations.
One court that has employed this approach seemed to equate
“recapture of forgone opportunities” with attempts to use
changed circumstances to obtain a favorable modification of the
contract.211  In that case, the plaintiff, Tufankjian, sought financ-
ing to purchase an automobile dealership.212  A representative
from Rockland Bank (“Bank”) approached Tufankjian regarding
floor-plan financing.213  Tufankjian was not interested in this type
of financing, but entered into negotiations with the Bank regard-
ing other financing options.214  According to Tufankjian, a Bank
representative offered to lend him part of the purchase price at a
fixed interest rate of 7.5 percent, with the remaining financing
provided though a Small Business Administration (SBA) loan at
a guaranteed interest rate of 6.5 percent or less.215  Tufankjian
signed a commitment letter that did not mention the SBA loan
interest rate.216  This loan was conditioned on procurement of the
SBA loan.217
The SBA refused to lend Tufankjian the balance of the
purchase price at 6.5 percent, and there was testimony that the
Bank made disparaging comments about Tufankjian to the SBA
and otherwise obstructed his efforts to perform under the agree-
ment.218  Additionally, the Bank attempted to convince Tufank-
jian to change the terms of their agreement by agreeing to loan
him the entire amount if he agreed to a higher interest rate, and
by including floor-plan financing as part of the agreement.219
“The Bank, by its actions, was seeking ‘to recapture opportuni-
210 Burton, supra note 4, at 378.
211 See Tufankjian v. Rockland Trust Co., 782 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
212 Id. at 3.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 3-4.
216 Id. at 4.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 4-5.  It is unclear from the opinion what performance was obstructed by
the Bank.
219 Id. at 5.
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ties forgone on contracting’ as determined by [Tufankjian’s] rea-
sonable expectations and to secure a better deal from him.”220
To the extent that “recapturing forgone opportunities” is sy-
nonymous with attempts to modify agreements, the pressured
party has the option of refusing to agree to the modifications.
Moreover, if the pressuring party is interfering with another con-
tract or business relationship, a remedy is available in tort.221  Fi-
nally, even jurisdictions that do not recognize a duty of good
faith in every contract prohibit one party from impairing or
preventing the other party’s performance.222  Thus, no implied
covenant of good faith is necessary to vindicate the rights of the
parties in these circumstances.
G. Use of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith to
Save On Transaction Costs
One justification for the implied covenant of good faith is that
it allows parties to enter into binding contracts without requiring
that they spell out every term.  The good-faith covenant is one of
several “gap-fillers” that allegedly give effect to those of the par-
ties’ intentions that they had not bothered to spell out.  While use
of the implied good-faith covenant may be justified as a gap-filler
to address situations that the parties could not have anticipated
at the time of contract, it is inadvisable to encourage parties to
deliberately leave terms open for the courts to fill in later.
The fallacy lies in the assumption that the courts can and will
effectively discern the parties’ intentions, or that all parties had
the same expectations.  More importantly, any savings from
choosing not to spell out the contract terms are spent in litigation
costs.  Because the parties’ performance will be judged based on
subjective, largely abstract criteria, a party can never be certain
that the other party and the court will agree that it has complied
with all of its implied obligations.223  Merely performing or exer-
220 Id. (quoting Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 821
(Mass. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
221 “The elements of tortious interference with a contract are: (1) the existence of
a contract subject to interference; (2) the occurrence of an act of interference that
was willful and intentional; (3) the act was a proximate cause of the claimant’s dam-
age; and (4) actual damage or loss occurred.”  Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63
S.W.3d 841, 856-57 (Tex. App. 2001).
222 See discussion infra Part VI.
223 See Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1079-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002) (“We recognize that expressions such as ‘bad faith,’ ‘improper motive,’
and other similar words and phrases used to describe the requisite state of mind
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 49 21-OCT-05 9:24
Losing Faith 275
cising discretion honestly and—in the opinion of that party—rea-
sonably is not enough; instead, the party must be able to
convince the court or jury that it performed with honorable inten-
tions and within the reasonable expectations of the other party.
This can rarely be resolved on summary judgment, and certainly
not without a fair amount of discovery.  Even the most straight-
forward case may languish on the docket for months or even
years before finally being resolved by summary judgment or a
trial.  Appeals may delay resolution even longer.  Viewed from
this perspective, little is saved by encouraging parties to leave
contract terms open and allowing courts to fill in those blanks
with the implied covenant of good faith.
IV
ISSUES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
There are courts and scholars who view Taylor, Kham, and
similarly decided cases as regrettable retractions of the law of
good faith.224  Some view the rise of the “textualist” approach to
good faith as “a return to the formalist presumptions of late nine-
teenth-century contract law” when courts refused to look beyond
the four corners of the contract to determine the parties’ in-
tent.225  This fear is largely unfounded.  There is a middle ground
between formalism and an expansive view of good faith.  Re-
specting the primacy of the parties’ agreement does not mean
relying exclusively on the agreement’s text.  Instead, it means
that the agreement cannot be disregarded in favor of more equi-
table or “fairer” terms as determined ex post facto by the court
or jury.  The parties’ bargain, as determined based upon all ad-
missible evidence, will be respected even if the result seems
somewhat unfair or the actions of one party seem unkind.
Supporters of the good-faith duty argue that critics place too
provide little guidance. . . . Ultimately, . . . the presence of bad faith is to be found in
the eye of the beholder or, more to the point, in the eye of the trier of fact.”).
224 See Van Alstine, supra note 14, at 1263-65 (describing Taylor as illustrative of
the decline of the duty of good faith); Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Sev-
enth Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503, 506, 522
(1991) (criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Kham & Nate, stating that he “ad-
vances a conception of good faith that is completely at odds with all of the operative
conceptualizations of good faith”).
225 Van Alstine, supra note 14, at 1265.  “Like its classical ancestor, this rejuve-
nated textualism proceeds on the premise that every express contract term reflects
the parties’ final agreement on the subject.” Id.
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much emphasis on the express language of contracts.226  To the
extent that courts look only to contract language and ignore con-
text, this criticism may be valid.  However, ignoring contractual
language in favor of the parties’ perceived expectations is equally
imprudent.  Instead, courts should—consistent with applicable
interpretive rules—determine the full scope of the parties’ agree-
ment, including any oral or collateral agreements, course of deal-
ing, usage of trade, course of performance, modifications, or
information that resolves latent or patent ambiguities.227
If the parties agreed to something other than what is reflected
in the express terms of the writing, then the court should enforce
that agreement, not based on good faith, but rather based on the
parties’ bargain.  If the agreement has been modified, or a party’s
words or actions have induced reliance by another party, the doc-
trine of waiver or estoppel may provide the relying party with
relief.  In these ways, expectations based on the agreement or the
parties’ intentional actions are protected without imposing liabil-
ity for expectations based solely on inference or hope.  Indeed, in
many cases where the implied covenant of good faith is invoked,
it is because one party has made statements or taken actions
upon which the other party relied.  Rather than rely on the tradi-
tional contract doctrines or argue that the parties’ actual bargain
varies from the written agreement, the courts rely on the doctrine
of good faith.
Admittedly, jurisdictions that embrace the plain-meaning rule,
or that confine their inquiry to the four corners of the agreement
when the terms appear to be unambiguous, may fail to interpret
the contract in accordance with the parties’ intentions and under-
standing.228  Nonetheless, a change in the rule of contract inter-
226 See id. at 1272.
227 The parol evidence rule may present an obstacle, but in reality, it bars only a
relatively narrow range of evidence.  Evidence of subsequent agreements or modifi-
cations is not barred.  Nor is evidence of prior consistent additional agreements
barred, unless the contract is fully integrated.  If there is convincing evidence that
the parties entered into collateral agreements, the court is unlikely to find that the
agreement is fully integrated.  Even evidence of conflicting terms or agreements is
not barred if the parties did not intend for the writing to be the final expression of
their agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981) (Parol
Evidence Rule).
228 See W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Gianconteri, 566 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 1990) (holding
that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to prove that a contract is ambiguous if it is
unambiguous on its face). But see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (holding that extrinsic evidence is admissible
to determine whether a contract term is ambiguous).
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pretation to determine the parties’ actual agreement is preferable
to a pretense of enforcing the contract by adding implied terms
that give effect to the parties’ presumed expectations.229
Although the result may be the same, the danger with the im-
plied covenant of good faith is that the court may go beyond en-
forcing the parties’ agreement to enforcing the agreement that it
believes the parties should have made.  Often, this means that the
court enforces what it considers to be a fair bargain, as opposed
to the bargain actually negotiated by the parties.  It is another
way of ensuring adequacy of consideration or mutuality of obli-
gations, although courts have consistently denied any such re-
quirements.230  Moreover, no party risks being bound by
expectations or obligations of which they were unaware.
V
AVAILABILITY OF OTHER REMEDIES
Reliance on the implied duty of good faith is often unnecessary
to achieve the equitable result desired by courts.  Instead, the
party allegedly acting in bad faith has often breached the con-
tract in some other respect, or may have committed a tort.  Re-
covery under either of these options is preferable to resorting to
the duty of good faith.  For example, in Sons of Thunder, Inc. v.
Borden, Inc.,231 Sons of Thunder sued Borden for breach of a
long-term supply contract for clams.232  Sons of Thunder claimed
breach of several express contract terms.233  In addition, it sought
damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith in con-
nection with Borden’s performance under the contract.234  Al-
though the UCC governed the contract, the court relied on the
common law in reaching its decision.235
As an initial matter, there was confusion regarding the basis
for the alleged breach of the duty of good faith.236  The jury in-
229 This is so because a more comprehensive approach to contract interpretation
allows the court to discern the parties’ actual agreement, not simply what was in-
cluded in a writing, without unnecessary resort to implied covenants.
230 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981).
231 690 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1997).
232 Id. at 581.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 585.
235 Id. at 587 (“Although the UCC governs this case, the obligation to perform in
good faith found in our common law will also influence the result.”).
236 Id. at 584-87.
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struction had merely asked whether Borden “breached its obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing to plaintiff . . . in terminating
the Contract by its letter of May 8, 1987.”237  The jury answered
the question in the affirmative.238  Because it was undisputed that
Borden had an unrestricted right to terminate the contract on
ninety-day notice,239 the appellate court held that the trial court
erred when it denied Borden’s motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on that question.240
Borden was also found liable for breach of contract for failing
to purchase the required amount of clams and failing to pay the
contract price for those clams purchased.241  Borden agreed to
pay the assessed damages for these breaches and withdrew its
claims that the trial court erred in other respects.242  This left the
alleged breach of the good-faith duty as the only issue on
appeal.243
The appellate court held that the express terms of the contract
allowed Borden to terminate with ninety-day notice, and that
Borden’s exercise of that right “cannot be overridden or elimi-
nated by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”244
The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed that the good-faith
claim was based on Borden’s termination of the contract.245  In-
stead, it agreed with the trial court that the claim was based on
Borden’s performance of the contract, not its termination.246
The court determined that the jury could reasonably have
found that Borden breached its obligation to perform in good
faith.247  In support of this conclusion, the court noted various
237 Id. at 582.
238 Id.
239 Note that the ninety-day notice provision prevents Borden’s promises from
being illusory.  Thus, there is no need for the implied covenant of good faith in order
for the contract to be enforceable.
240 Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 584 (N.J. 1997).
241 Id. at 582-83.
242 Id. at 583-84.
243 Id. at 584.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 585.
246 Id. (“Question 3 suggests that the good faith issue deals only with Borden’s
termination of the contract.  In fact, the majority’s opinion was premised on that
interpretation.  However, after reading the jury instructions as a whole, we have no
doubt that the trial court designed Question 3 to deal with Borden’s good faith in
performing, not terminating, the contract and that the jury understood that
instruction.”).
247 Id. at 589.
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ways in which Borden breached the contract.248
Borden knew that Sons of Thunder depended on the income
from its contract with Borden to pay back the loan.  Yet, Bor-
den continuously breached that contract by never buying the
required amount of clams from the Sons of Thunder.  Further-
more, . . . [a Borden Manager] . . . told [a principal of Sons of
Thunder] that he would not honor the contract with Sons of
Thunder.249
The court also noted that Borden was aware that Sons of
Thunder was guaranteeing the loans of Sea Work (a company
affiliated with Sons of Thunder) and knew that the corporations
were dependent upon one another so that if one failed, the other
would also likely fail.250  Borden terminated its contract with Sea
Work after a short time, leaving Sea Work with no market for its
products.251  Borden also charged Sea Work for services for
which it had not previously charged and pressured the company’s
principles to obtain financing to repay an advance from Borden,
despite Borden’s knowledge of the company’s precarious finan-
cial position.252
Accepting these facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom
offered as true, we determine that the jury had sufficient evi-
dence to find that Borden was not “honest in fact,” as required
by the UCC.  Because its conduct destroyed Sons of Thunder’s
reasonable expectations and right to receive the fruits of the
contract, Borden also breached the implied covenant of good
faith found in New Jersey’s common law.253
To the extent that Borden’s actions were contrary to the ex-
press terms of the contract, the implied covenant of good faith is
irrelevant; indeed, these actions were the basis of the damage
award for breach of contract.  Thus, allowing recovery for breach
of the good-faith covenant based on these actions would be du-
plicative and unnecessary.  To the extent that Borden acted dis-
honestly, Sons of Thunder may have had an action for fraud or







254 “The elements of fraud are: (1) a material misrepresentation (2) made know-
ingly (scienter) (3) with intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting (4)
upon which the plaintiff justifiably relies (5) with damages.” Beeck v. Kapalis, 302
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Iowa 1981).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 54 21-OCT-05 9:24
280 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
with the intention of inducing Sons of Thunder to incur addi-
tional debt or otherwise act in detrimental reliance on Borden’s
actions,255 then Borden may have been liable for fraud, estopped
from asserting its right to terminate, or found to have waived its
right to terminate.  Conversely, if Borden’s actions were consis-
tent with the language of the contract, and it did nothing to jus-
tify Sons of Thunder’s belief that it would not exercise its right to
terminate, a finding that it breached the duty of good faith is
erroneous.256
The court seemed concerned by Borden’s decision to exercise
its contractual rights and take actions that were not in violation
of the contract when those actions had a detrimental effect on
Sons of Thunder and its related companies.  However, Sons of
Thunder had no reason to believe that Borden would keep the
contract in force indefinitely, irrespective of changes in the mar-
ket, Borden’s management, or any other market force.257  Sons
of Thunder certainly had no right to hold Borden responsible for
the success of companies related to Sons of Thunder that were
not parties to the contract.258  Borden, on the other hand, had
every reason to believe that it had the right to terminate the con-
tract on ninety-day notice because the contract unambiguously
conferred that right.259
255 It is interesting to note that the court was influenced by Borden’s statements to
the Bank on behalf of Sons of Thunder that it “expected the contract to run for five
years” but acknowledged that the contract could be terminated within one year.
Sons of Thunder, 690 A.2d at 578.  This testimony makes clear that Borden (and
Sons of Thunder) hoped to continue the contract on a long-term basis, but that Bor-
den continued to acknowledge its right to terminate the contract in the short term.
Moreover, this statement did not induce Sons of Thunder to seek the loan; instead, it
simply helped to convince the Bank to approve the loan that Sons of Thunder had
sought before the statements were made. Id.  The Bank or Sons of Thunder could
have insisted that Borden amend the contract so that it had a definite five-year term,
but apparently no such agreement or modification was sought or agreed to.
256 See Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 98 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that plaintiff had no justified expectation that Deere was surrender-
ing its absolute right to refuse to consent to assignment of plaintiff’s dealership when
contract gave Deere absolute right to refuse).
257 One of the reasons given for terminating the contract was Borden’s discovery
that due to an accounting error, the project would not be profitable and it was rec-
ommended that the project be terminated. Sons of Thunder, 690 A.2d at 580.
258 In fact, Sons of Thunder’s principal sought additional financing for a related
company even after one of Borden’s managers stated that he did not intend to abide
by the Sons of Thunder contract at all. Id. at 579.  At least at that point, Sons of
Thunder knew that Borden was likely to exercise its termination rights at any time.
259 Assuming, of course, that it did nothing that would constitute a waiver of that
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VI
AN ALTERNATIVE: SPECIFIC DUTIES THAT MAY BE
IMPLIED OR BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED WITHOUT
THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
One disadvantage of refusing to include the implied covenant
of good faith in every contract is the potential impact that this
may have on associated contractual duties.  Many courts have in-
cluded several discrete duties under the umbrella of the general
duty of good faith, and if the duty of good faith is not included in
the contract at issue, then it might be feared that those duties do
not exist either.  For example, the duty of disclosure and the duty
of cooperation are often invoked as part of the duty of good
faith.260  Likewise, a party may be prohibited from preventing or
impairing the other party’s performance.261
Yet it is possible for jurisdictions to recognize these duties
without recognizing a general duty of good faith.262  Decreeing
the existence of a general duty of good faith, particularly when
that duty is defined in vague or confusing terms, does not provide
contracting parties or courts much guidance as to which specific
actions are prohibited or required.  If a particular duty is recog-
nized in a jurisdiction, the scope and application of that duty can
right or take any action to induce Sons of Thunder to justifiably rely on its continua-
tion of the contract.
260 “There is in every contract an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. This
duty obligates the parties to cooperate with each other so that each may obtain the
full benefit of performance.”  Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 360
(Wash. 1991); see also, e.g., Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991)
(implying that implied covenant of good faith includes duty to disclose contract
rights to other party to avoid taking advantage of their oversight); Miss. Comm’n on
Envtl. Quality v. Desai, 868 So. 2d 381 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing duty to
cooperate as part of definition of good faith).
261 See discussion supra Part III.B. See also Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d
521, 531 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (“Under Maryland law, a duty of good faith and
fair dealing is an implied term in certain contracts, but this duty simply prohibits one
party to a contract from acting in such a manner as to prevent the other party from
performing his obligations under the contract.”) (citation omitted); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981).
262 Texas does not recognize an implied covenant of good faith in every contract,
but does prohibit interference with the other party’s performance. See Dorsett v.
Cross, 106 S.W.3d 213, 217 (Tex. App. 2003) (“When the obligation of a party to a
contract depends upon a certain condition’s being performed, and the fulfillment of
the condition is prevented by the act of the other party, the condition is considered
fulfilled.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981) (recogniz-
ing duty of disclosure when non-disclosure is equivalent to an assertion).
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be defined with a degree of specificity that may be lacking when
it is placed under the umbrella of the general duty of good faith.
CONCLUSION
The implied covenant of good faith can be a useful tool for
interpreting and enforcing the parties’ bargain.  However, it is
useful only if the rights and obligations imposed can be defined
with a reasonable degree of certainty, and if those rights and ob-
ligations reflect the parties’ agreement.  Thus far, courts and
scholars have been unable to settle on a meaningful conceptual-
ization of the duty of good faith when that duty is implied in
every contract.  Worse yet, courts have begun to embrace an ex-
pansive view of good faith that imposes obligations contrary to
the express terms of the parties’ agreement.  This trend needs to
be reversed.
The implied covenant of good faith should not be included in
every contract.  Instead, the duty of good faith should be im-
posed only when necessary to interpret or fill gaps in parties’
agreements, in cases where there is a special relationship be-
tween the parties, or when courts or legislatures have defined the
duty of good faith in specific terms that are applicable to the con-
duct at issue.  Finally, the duty of good faith, when it is recog-
nized, should not be used to impose obligations in addition or
contrary to those included in the parties’ agreement, or to make
otherwise enforceable contracts “fair.”  So long as the terms are
not unconscionable and do not violate public policy, the agree-
ment of the parties should be respected and enforced.
